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Abstract—We present a simple resolution proof system for
higher-order constrained Horn clauses (HoCHC)—a system of
higher-order logic modulo theories—and prove its soundness
and refutational completeness w.r.t. both standard and Henkin
semantics. As corollaries, we obtain the compactness theorem
and semi-decidability of HoCHC for semi-decidable background
theories, and we prove that HoCHC satisfies a canonical model
property. Moreover a variant of the well-known translation
from higher-order to 1st-order logic is shown to be sound and
complete for HoCHC in both semantics. We illustrate how to
transfer decidability results for (fragments of) 1st-order logic
modulo theories to our higher-order setting, using as example
the Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey fragment of HoCHC modulo a
restricted form of Linear Integer Arithmetic.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cathcart Burn et al. [1] recently advocated an automatic,
programming-language independent approach to verify safety
properties of higher-order programs by framing them as
solvability problems for systems of higher-order constraints.
These systems consist of Horn clauses of higher-order logic,
containing constraints expressed in some suitable background
theory. Consider the functional program:
let add x y = x+ y
letrec iter f s n = if n ≤ 0 then s else f n (iter f s (n− 1))
in λn.assert
(
n ≥ 1 → (iter add nn > n+ n)
)
Thus (iter add nn) computes the value n+
∑n
i=1 i.
To verify that the program is safe (i.e. the assertion is never
violated), it suffices to find overapproximations of the input-
output-graph (i.e. invariants) of the functions that imply the
required property. The idea then is to express the problem of
finding such a program invariant, logically, as a satisfiability
problem for the following higher-order constrained system:
Example 1 (Invariant as system of higher-order constraints).
∀x, y, z .
(
z = x+ y → Add x y z
)
∀f, s, n, x .
(
n ≤ 0 ∧ s = x→ Iter f s n x
)
∀f, s, n, x .
(
n > 0 ∧ ∃y . (Iter f s (n− 1) y ∧ f n y x)
→ Iter f s n x
)
∀n, x .
(
n ≥ 1 ∧ Iter Add nnx → x > n+ n
)
The above are Horn clauses of higher-order logic, obtained by
transformation from the preceding program; Add : ι → ι →
ι → o and Iter : (ι → ι → ι → o) → ι → ι → ι → o are
higher-order relations, and the binary predicates (≤, >, · · · )
are formulas of the background theory, Linear Integer Arith-
metic (LIA).
Since the the assertion in the program is violated for n = 1,
the clauses are unsatisfiable.
Is higher-order logic modulo theories a sensible algorithmic
approach to verification? Is it well-founded?
To set the scene, recall that 1st-order logic is semi-
decidable: 1st-order validities1 are recursively enumerable;
moreover if a formula is unsatisfiable then it is provable by
resolution [2], [3]. By contrast, higher-order logic in standard
semantics is wildly undecidable. E.g. the set1 V2(=) of valid
sentences of the 2nd-order language of equality is not even
analytical [4].
This does not necessarily spell doom for the higher-order
logic approach. One could consider higher-order logic in
Henkin semantics [5], which is, after all, “nothing but many-
sorted 1st-order logic with comprehension axioms” [4] (see
also [6], [7]). However, because the standard semantics is
natural and comparatively simple, it seems to be the semantics
of choice in program verification (e.g. monadic 2nd-order
logic in model checking, and HOL theorem prover [8], [9]
in automated deduction) and in program specification.
In this paper, we study the algorithmic, model-theoretic and
semantical properties of higher-order Horn clauses with a 1st-
order background theory.
a) A Complete Resolution Proof System for HoCHC:
The main technical contribution of this paper is the design of
a simple resolution proof system for higher-order constrained
Horn clauses (HoCHC) where the background theory has
a unique model [1], and its refutational completeness proof
with respect to the standard semantics (Sec. IV). The proof
system and its refutational completeness proof are generalised
in Sec. VI to arbitrary compact background theories, which
may have more than one model.
The completeness proof hinges on a novel model-theoretic
insight: we prove that the immediate consequence operator is
quasi-continuous, although it is not continuous in the standard
1Define Vn(P ) to be the set of valid sentences of nth-order logic with
2-place predicate P . Then V1(=) is recursively enumerable
Scott sense. Thus, the immediate consequence operator gives
rise to a syntactic explanation for unsatisfiability. Moreover,
we adapt the proof of the standardisation theorem of the λ-
calculus in [10] to argue that this explanation can be captured
by the rules of the resolution proof system.
b) Canonical Model Property: As shown in [1], a dis-
advantage of the standard semantics is failure of the least
model property (w.r.t. the pointwise ordering). However, we
prove in Sec. III that the immediate consequence operator is
“sufficiently” monotone and hence (by an extension of the
Knaster-Tarski theorem) gives rise to a model of all satisfiable
instances.
c) Compactness Theorem and Semi-decidability of
HoCHC: A well-known feature of higher-order logic in stand-
ard semantics is failure of the compactness theorem. As a
consequence of HoCHC’s refutational completeness, it follows
that the compactness theorem does hold for HoCHC (in
standard semantics): for every unsatisfiable set Γ of HoCHCs,
there is a finite subset Γ′ ⊆ Γ which is unsatisfiable.
Moreover, if the consistency of conjunctions of atoms
in the background theory is semi-decidable, so is HoCHC
unsatisfiability. Crucially, this underpins the practicality of the
HoCHC-based approach to program verification.
d) Semantic Invariance: The soundness and complete-
ness of our resolution proof system has another pleasing
corollary: satisfiability of HoCHC does not depend on the
choice of semantics2 (Sec. V). In particular, this constitutes an
alternative proof of the equivalence of standard, monotone and
continuous semantics for HoCHCs, without exhibiting explicit
translations between semantics. Moreover, this demonstrates
that, in contrast to (full) higher-order logic, satisfiability of
HoCHCs with respect to standard semantics on the one hand,
and to Henkin semantics on the other, coincide.
Semantic invariance is an important advantage for program
verification. It follows that one can use (the simpler and more
intuitive) standard semantics for specification, but use Henkin
semantics for the development of refined proof systems that
are complete [11-14], and use continuous semantics (which
enjoys a richer structure) to construct solution methods and in
static analysis.
e) Complete 1st-order Translation: As suggested by the
equivalence of standard and Henkin semantics, we show that
there is a variant of the standard translation of higher-order
logic into 1st-order logic which is sound and complete also
for standard semantics, when restricted to HoCHC (Sec. VII).
f) Decidable Fragments of HoCHC: Satisfiability of fi-
nite sets of HoCHCs is trivially decidable for background
theories with finite domains. In Sec. VIII, we identify a
fragment3 of HoCHC (the Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey frag-
ment of HoCHC modulo a restricted form of Linear Integer
Arithmetic) with a decidable satisfiability problem by showing
2within the reasonable bounds formalised by (complete) frames
3Another one (higher-order Datalog) is presented in App. F1.
equi-satisfiability to clauses w.r.t. a finite number of such
background theories.
Outline: We begin with some key definitions in Sec. II.
Then we show that even standard semantics satisfies a canon-
ical model property (Sec. III). In Sec. IV, we present the resol-
ution proof system for HoCHC and prove its completeness. In
Sec. V we show HoCHC’s semantic invariance and in Sec. VI
we generalise the refutational completeness proof to compact
background theories, which may have more than one model.
In Sec. VII we present a 1st-order translation of higher-order
logic and prove it complete when restricted to HoCHC. In
Sec. VIII we exhibit decidable fragments of HoCHC. Finally,
we discuss related work in Sec. IX, and conclude in Sec. X.
II. TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES
This section introduces the syntax and semantics of a
restricted form of higher-order logic (Sec. II-A), higher-order
constrained Horn clauses (Sec. II-B) and programs (Sec. II-C).
A. Relational Higher-order Logic
1) Syntax: For a fixed set I (intuitively the types of
individuals), the set of argument types, relational types, 1st-
order types and types (generated by I) are mutual recursively
defined by
Argument type τ ::= ι | ρ
Relational type ρ ::= o | τ → ρ
1st-order type σFO ::= ι | ι→ o | ι→ σFO
Type σ ::= ρ | σFO,
where ι ∈ I. We sometimes abbreviate the (1st-order) type
ι→ · · · → ι︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
→ ι to ιn → ι (similarly for ιn → o). For types
τ1 → · · · → τn → σ we also write τ → σ. Intuitively, o is the
type of the truth values (or Booleans). Besides, σFO contains
all (1st-order) types of the form ιn → ι or ιn → o, i.e. all
arguments are of type ι. Moreover, each relational type has
the form τ → o.
A type environment (typically ∆) is a function mapping
variables (typically denoted by x, y, z etc.) to argument types;
for x ∈ dom(∆), we write x : τ ∈ ∆ to mean ∆(x) = τ .
A signature is a set of distinct typed symbols c : σ, where
c 6∈ dom(∆) and c is not one of the logical symbols ¬, ∧, ∨
and ∃τ (for argument types τ , which we omit frequently). It
is 1st-order if for each c : σ ∈ Σ, σ is 1st-order. We often
write c ∈ Σ if c : σ ∈ Σ for some σ.
The set of Σ-pre-terms is given by
M ::= x | c | ¬ | ∧ | ∨ | ∃τ |MM | λx.M
where c ∈ Σ. Following the usual conventions we assume that
application associates to the left and the scope of abstractions
extend as far to the right as possible. We also write M N and
λx.M ′ for M N1 · · ·Nn and λx1. · · ·λxn.M ′, respectively,
assuming implicitly that M is not an application. Besides,
we abbreviate ∃τ (λx.M) as ∃x.M . Moreover, we identify
2
x ∈ dom(∆)
∆ ⊢ x : ∆(x)
(Var) c : σ ∈ Σ
∆ ⊢ c : σ
(Cst)
∆ ⊢M1 : σ1 → σ2 ∆ ⊢M2 : σ1
∆ ⊢M1M2 : σ2
(App)
∆ ⊢M : ρ
∆ ⊢ λx.M : ∆(x)→ ρ
(Abs)
◦ ∈ {∧,∨}
∆ ⊢ ◦ : o→ o→ o
(And/Or) ∆ ⊢M : o
∆ ⊢ ¬M : o
(Neg)
∆ ⊢ ∃τ : (τ → o)→ o
(Ex)
Figure 1. Typing judgements
terms up to α-equivalence and adopt Barendregt’s variable
convention [15].
The typing judgement ∆ ⊢ M : σ is defined in Fig. 1. We
say that M is Σ-term if ∆ ⊢ M : σ for some σ and it is a
Σ-formula if σ = o. A Σ-formula is a 1st-order Σ-formula
if its construction is restricted to symbols c : σFO ∈ Σ and
variables x : ι ∈ ∆, and uses no λ-abstraction. Finally, for a
Σ-term M , fv(M) is the set of free variables, and M is a
closed Σ-term if fv(M) = ∅.
Remark 2. It follows from the definitions that (i) each term
∆ ⊢ M : ιn → ι can only contain variables of type ι
and constants of non-relational 1st-order type, and contains
neither λ-abstractions nor logical symbols (a similar approach
is adopted in [16]); (ii) ¬ can only occur in a term if applied
to a formula (and not in pre-terms of the form R¬).
The following kind of terms is particularly significant:
Definition 3. A Σ-term is positive existential if the logical
constant “¬” is not a subterm.
For Σ-terms M,N1, . . . , Nn and variables x1, . . . , xn sat-
isfying ∆ ⊢ Ni : ∆(xi), the (simultaneous) substitution
M [N1/x1, . . . , Nn/xn] is defined in the standard way.
2) Semantics: There are two classic semantics for higher-
order logic: standard and Henkin semantics [5]. Whereas
in standard semantics the interpretation of higher types is
uniquely determined by the domains of individuals (quantifiers
range over all set-theoretic functions of the appropriate type),
it can be stipulated quite liberally in Henkin semantics.
Formally, a pre-frame F assigns to each type σ a non-empty
set FJσK such that
(i) FJoK := B := {0, 1} and for each type σ1 → σ2,
FJσ1 → σ2K ⊆ [FJσ1K → FJσ2K]
(ii) and, or ∈ FJo→ o→ oK
(iii) ∃τ ∈ FJ(τ → o)→ oK for each argument type τ
where [FJσ1K → FJσ2K] is the set of functions FJσ1K →
FJσ2K and
and(b1)(b2) := min{b1, b2} or(b1)(b2) := max{b1, b2}
existsτ (r) := max{r(s) | s ∈ FJτK}
Example 4 (Pre-frames). For every ι ∈ I, we fix an arbitrary
non-empty set Dι. We define S, M and C, which we call
the standard, monotone and continuous frame, respectively,
recursively by SJoK :=MJoK := CJoK := B; SJιK :=MJιK :=
CJιK := Dι for ι ∈ I; and
SJτ → σK := [SJτK → SJσK]
MJτ → σK := [MJτK
m
−→MJσK]
CJτ → σK := [CJτK
c
−→ CJσK],
where [P
m
−→ P ′] ([P
c
−→ P ′]) is the set of monotone
(continuous) functions from the posets P to P ′ (cf. [17]).
Let Σ be a signature and F be a pre-frame. A (Σ,F)-
structure A assigns to each c : σ ∈ Σ an element cA ∈ FJσK
and we set AJσK := FJσK for types σ. A (∆,F)-valuation α
is a function such that for every x : τ ∈ ∆, α(x) ∈ FJτK. For
a (∆,F)-valuation α, variable x and r ∈ FJ∆(x)K, α[x 7→ r]
is defined in the usual way.
The denotation AJMK(α) of a term M with respect to A
and α is defined recursively by
AJxK(α) := α(x)
AJ∧K(α) := and
AJ∃τ K(α) := existsτ
AJM1M2K(α) := AJM1K(α)(AJM2K(α))
AJλx.MK(α) := [λr ∈ AJ∆(x)K.AJMK(α[x 7→ r])]∆(x)→ρ
AJcK(α) := cA
AJ∨K(α) := or
AJ¬MK(α) := 1−AJMK(α)
(assuming ∆ ⊢ M : ρ in the last case), where [r]σ = r if
r ∈ AJσK and otherwise [r]σ ∈ AJσK is arbitrary. Thus, for
each term ∆ ⊢M : σ, AJMK(α) ∈ AJσK.
Being independent of valuations, the denotation of closed
terms M is abbreviated as AJMK. Besides, for Σ-formulas F ,
we write A, α |= F if AJF K(α) = 1, and A |= F if for all α′,
A, α′ |= F . We extend |= in the usual way to sets of formulas.
A frame is a pre-frame F that satisfies the
Comprehension Axiom: for each signature Σ, type en-
vironment ∆, (Σ,F)-structure A, (∆,F)-valuation α,
positive existential Σ-term λx.M , and r ∈ AJ∆(x)K,
AJλx.MK(α)(r) = AJMK(α[x 7→ r]).
Our comprehension axiom ensures that positive existential
terms are interpreted in the expected way; it is non-standard
in that it is restricted to positive existential formulas.
As a consequence, if F is a frame then for every relational
type τ → o, ⊤τ→o ∈ FJτ → oK, where 1 =: ⊤τ→o(r) =
AJλx. yK(α[y 7→ 1])(r).
a) Complete Frames: For types σ, let ⊑σ ⊆ FJσK ×
FJσK be the usual partial order defined pointwise for higher
3
types, which is the discrete order on FJιK and the “less than
or equal” relation on FJoK.
For relational types ρ and R ⊆ FJρK, the least upper bound⊔
ρR is defined pointwise, by recursion on ρ. In particular,⊔
τ→o ∅ = ⊥τ→o, where ⊥τ→o(r) := 0. For a singleton set
{f} ⊆ FJιn → ιK we define
⊔
ιn→ι{f} := f . Throughout the
paper, we omit type subscripts to reduce clutter because they
can be inferred.
A (pre-)frame F is complete if for every relational ρ and
R ⊆ FJρK,
⊔
R ∈ FJρK, i.e. each FJρK is a complete lattice
ordered by ⊑ρ with least upper bounds
⊔
ρ.
Example 5 (complete frames). S is trivially a complete frame.
It is not difficult to prove that M and C are also complete
frames (App. A3).
b) 1st-order Structures: Let Σ be a 1st-order signature. A
1st-order Σ-structure is a (Σ,S)-structure. Note that by taking
standard frames this coincides with the standard definition in
a purely 1st-order setting (cf. e.g. [18]).
Example 6. In the examples we will primarily be concerned
with the signature of Linear Integer Arithmetic4 ΣLIA :=
{0, 1,+,−, <,≤,=, 6=,≥, >} and its standard model ALIA.
B. Higher-order Constrained Horn Clauses
Assumption. Henceforth, we fix a 1st-order signature Σ over
a single type of individuals ι and a 1st-order Σ-structure A.
Moreover, we fix a signature Σ′ extending Σ with (only)
symbols of relational type, and a type environment ∆ such
that ∆−1(τ) is infinite for each argument type τ .
Intuitively, Σ and A correspond to the language and inter-
pretation of the background theory, e.g. ΣLIA together with
its standard model ALIA. In particular, we first focus on
background theories with a single model. In Sec. VI we extend
our results to a more general setting.
We are interested in whether 1st-order structures can be
expanded to larger (higher-order) signatures. This is made
precise by the following:
Definition 7. (i) A frame F expands A if FJιK = AJιK and
cA ∈ FJσK for all c : σ ∈ Σ.
(ii) Suppose F expands A. Then a (Σ′,F)-structure B is a
(Σ′,F)-expansion of A if cA = cB for all c ∈ Σ.
Remark 8. (i) By Remark 2 the denotation of terms ∆ ⊢
M : ιn → ι is the same for all (Σ′,F)-expansions of A
and (∆,F)-valuations agreeing on ∆−1(τ).
(ii) In case F is complete, the (Σ′,F)-expansions of A
ordered by ⊑ constitute a complete lattice with least
4with the usual types 0, 1 : ι; +,− : ι → ι → ι and ⊳ : ι → ι → o
for ⊳ ∈ {<,≤,=, 6=,≥, >}; and we use the common abbreviation n for
1 + · · ·+ 1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
n
, where 1 ≤ n ∈ N
upper bounds
⊔
, where ⊑ and
⊔
are lifted in a pointwise
fashion to (Σ′,F)-expansions of A.5
Next, we introduce higher-order constrained Horn clauses
and their satisfiability problem.
Definition 9. (i) An atom is a Σ′-formula that does not
contain a logical symbol.
(ii) An atom is a background atom if it is also a 1st-order
Σ-formula. Otherwise it is a foreground atom.
Note that a foreground atom has one of the following forms:
(i) RM where R ∈ (Σ′ \ Σ), (ii) xM , or (iii) (λy.N)M .
We use ϕ and A (and variants thereof) to refer to back-
ground atoms and general atoms, respectively.
Definition 10 (HoCHC). (i) A goal clause is a disjunction
¬A1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬An, where each Ai is an atom. We write
⊥ to mean the empty (goal) clause.
(ii) If G is a goal clause, R ∈ (Σ′ \ Σ) and the variables in
x are distinct, then G ∨Rx is a definite clause.
(iii) A (higher-order) constrained Horn clause (HoCHC) is a
goal or definite clause.
In the following we transform the higher-order sentences in
Ex. 1 into HoCHCs (by first converting to prenex normal form
and then omitting the universal quantifiers).
Example 11 (A system of HoCHCs). Let Σ′ = ΣLIA∪{Add :
ι → ι → ι → o, Iter : (ι → ι → ι → o) → ι → ι → ι → o}
and let ∆ be a type environment satisfying ∆(x) = ∆(y) =
∆(z) = ∆(n) = ∆(s) = ι and ∆(f) = ι→ ι→ ι→ o.
¬(z = x+ y) ∨ Add x y z
¬(n ≤ 0) ∨ ¬(s = x) ∨ Iter f s n x
¬(n > 0) ∨ ¬ Iter f s (n− 1) y ∨ ¬(f n y x) ∨ Iter f s n x
¬(n ≥ 1) ∨ ¬ Iter Add nnx ∨ ¬(x ≤ n+ n)
We refer to the first three (definite) HoCHCs as D1 to D3 and
to the last (goal) HoCHC as G.
Definition 12. Let Γ be a set of HoCHCs, and suppose F is
a frame expanding A.
(i) Γ is (A,F)-satisfiable if there exists a (Σ′,F)-expansion
B of A satisfying B |= Γ.
(ii) Γ is A-Henkin-satisfiable if it is (A,F)-satisfiable for
some frame F expanding A.
(iii) Γ is A-standard-satisfiable if it is (A,S)-satisfiable.
(iv) Γ is A-monotone-satisfiable if it is (A,M)-satisfiable.
(v) Γ is A-continuous-satisfiable if it is (A, C)-satisfiable.
Observe that A-Henkin satisfiability is trivially implied by
all notions of satisfiability in Def. 12.
5This is possible because (Σ′,F)-expansions of A agree on symbols of
type ιn → ι.
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C. Programs
Whilst HoCHCs have a simple syntax (thus yielding a
simple proof system), our completeness proof relies on pro-
grams, which are syntactically slightly more complex.
Definition 13. A program (usually denoted by Π) is a set of
Σ′-formulas {¬FR ∨RxR | R ∈ (Σ′ \ Σ)} such that for each
R ∈ Σ′ \Σ, FR is positive existential, the variables in xR are
distinct, and fv(FR) ⊆ fv(RxR).
For each goal clause G there is a closed positive existential
formula6 posex(G) such that for each frame F and (Σ′,F)-
structure B, B 6|= G iff B |= posex(G). Similarly, for each
finite set of HoCHCs Γ, there exists a program6 ΠΓ such that
for each frame F and (Σ′,F)-structure B, B |= {D ∈ Γ |
D definite} iff B |= ΠΓ.
Example 14 (Program). The following program corresponds
to the set of (definite) HoCHCs of Ex. 11 (modulo renaming
of variables):
¬(z = x+ y) ∨ Add x y z
¬
(
(n ≤ 0 ∧ s = x) ∨
(∃y. n > 0 ∧ Iter f s (n− 1) y ∧ f n y x)
)
∨ Iter f s n x.
III. CANONICAL MODEL PROPERTY
The introduction of monotone semantics for HoCHC in [1]
was partly motivated by the observation that the least model
property (w.r.t. the pointwise ordering ⊑) fails for standard
semantics (but holds for monotone semantics):
Example 15. Consider the program Π
¬xR U ∨RxR ¬xU 6= xU ∨ U xU
with signature Σ′ = ΣLIA∪{R : ((ι→ o)→ o)→ o, U : ι→
o}, a type environment ∆ satisfying ∆(xR) = (ι → o) → o
and ∆(xU ) = ι taken from [1]. Let F = S be the standard
frame and let neg ∈ SJ(ι→ o)→ oK be such that neg(s) = 1
iff s = ⊥ι→o.
There are (at least) two expansions B1 and B2 defined by
UB1 = ⊥ι→o and RB1(s) = 1 iff s(⊥ι→o) = 1, and UB2 =
⊤ι→o and RB2(s) = 1 iff s(⊤ι→o) = 1, respectively.
Note that B1 |= Π, B2 |= Π and there are no models smaller
than any of these with respect to the pointwise ordering ⊑.
Furthermore, neither B1 ⊑ B2 nor B2 ⊑ B1 holds because
RB1(neg) = 1 > 0 = RB2(neg) and for any n ∈ SJιK,
UB2(n) = 1 > 0 = UB1(n).
In this section, we sharpen and extend the result: HoCHC
does enjoy a canonical (though not least w.r.t. ⊑) model
property. More precisely, the structure obtained by iterating
the immediate consequence operator (see e.g. [16]) is a model
of all satisfiable HoCHCs.
6see App. A2 for details
Assumption. For Sec. III and IV we fix a complete frame F
expanding A. Furthermore, let Γ be a finite set of HoCHCs
and let Π = ΠΓ (the program corresponding to Γ).
If no confusion arises, we refrain from mentioning Σ′, ∆
and F explicitly.
Given an expansion B of A, the immediate consequence
operator TΠ returns the expansion TΠ(B) of A defined by
RTΠ(B) := BJλxR. FRK, for relational symbols R ∈ Σ′ \ Σ.
(Recall that FR is the unique positive existential formula such
that ¬FR ∨ RxR ∈ Π.) Observe that the prefixed points of
TΠ (i.e. structures B such that TΠ(B) ⊑ B) are precisely the
models of Π.
Unfortunately, the immediate consequence operator is not
monotone w.r.t. ⊑. Hence, we cannot apply the Knaster-
Tarski theorem. Therefore, we introduce the notion of quasi-
monotonicity and a slightly stronger version of that theorem.
This is a warm-up for Sec. IV-A, where we propose quasi-
continuity and a version of Kleene’s fixed point theorem.
A. Quasi-monotonicity
Assumption. Let L be a complete lattice ordered by ≤ with
least upper bounds
∨
and least element ⊥. Furthermore, let
F : L→ L be an (endo-)function.
We define
aβ+1 := F (aβ) (β ∈ On)
aγ :=
∨
β<γ
aβ (γ ∈ Lim)
aF :=
∨
β∈On
aβ
In particular, a0 = ⊥. Clearly, aF , aβ ∈ L for all ordinals β.
Definition 16. Let - ⊆ L× L be a relation.
(i) - is compatible with ≤ if
(C1) for all a, b, c ∈ L, if a - b and b ≤ c then a - c,
(C2) for all a ∈ L and A ⊆ {b ∈ L | b - a},
∨
A - a.
(ii) F is quasi-monotone if for all a, b ∈ L, a - b implies
F (a) - F (b).
In particular, ≤ is compatible to itself and ⊥ - a for a ∈ L.
Proposition 17. (i) F (aF ) ≤ aF and (ii) if - is compatible
with ≤, F is quasi-monotone and b ∈ L satisfies F (b) ≤ b
then aF - b.
The proof idea is the same as for the standard Knaster-Tarski
theorem, which can be recovered from the above by using ≤
for -.
B. Application to the Immediate Consequence Operator
The idea now is to instantiate L with the complete lattice of
expansions of A (see Remark 8(ii)), and F with the immediate
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consequence operator TΠ. We denote the structure at stage β
by Aβ and the limit structure by AΠ.
Intuitively, we start from the ⊑-minimal structure assigning
⊥ρ to every R : ρ ∈ Σ′ \ Σ and we incrementally extend
the structure to satisfy more of the program. AΠ is a prefixed
point of TΠ (Prop. 17). Therefore,
Corollary 18. AΠ |= Π and AΠ |= {D ∈ Γ | D definite}.
Next, suppose there are relations -σ ⊆ FJσK × FJσK (for
types σ) compatible with ⊑σ, and
(i) if B - B′ and α - α′ then BJMK(α) - B′JMK(α′), and
(ii) b - b′ iff b ≤ b′ for b, b′ ∈ BJoK = B,
where we omit type subscripts and lift - in the usual point-
wise manner to structures and valuations. Then TΠ is quasi-
monotone. Besides, if B is an expansion of A satisfying
B |= Π then by Prop. 17, for closed positive existential
formulas F , AΠJF K ≤ BJF K. Consequently, AΠ |= Γ if
B |= Γ.
The main obstacle (and where ⊑ fails) is to ensure that -
is compatible with applications, i.e. if r -τ→ρ r
′ and s -τ s
′
then r(s) -ρ r
′(s′). Therefore, we simply define it that way:
Definition 19. We define a relation -σ ⊆ FJσK×FJσK as
follows by recursion on the type σ:
n -ι n
′ := n = n′ (n, n′ ∈ FJιK)
b -o b
′ := b ≤ b′ (b, b′ ∈ FJoK)
r -τ→σ r
′ := ∀s, s′ ∈ FJτK. s -τ s′ →
r(s) -σ r
′(s′) (r, r′ ∈ FJτ → σK)
- is transitive but neither reflexive (Ex. 20(iii)) nor antisym-
metric, in general, and coincides with the pointwise ordering
⊑ on the monotone frame M (Lemma 62(i)).
Example 20. (i) For all relational types ρ and s ∈ FJρK,
⊥ρ - s - ⊤ρ.
(ii) or - or, and - and and for argument types τ , existsτ -
existsτ
7.
(iii) Let F = S be the standard frame and let neg ∈ SJ(ι→
o) → oK as in Ex. 15. Recall that ⊥ι→o - ⊤ι→o.
However, neg(⊥ι→o) = 1 > 0 = neg(⊤ι→o). This
shows that - is not reflexive, in general.
Example 21. For the structures B1 and B2 of Ex. 15 it holds
that B1 = AΠ and B1 - B2 because due to ⊥ι→o - ⊤ι→o,
for any s - s′, s(⊥ι→o) ≤ s
′(⊤ι→o) and therefore R
B1(s) ≤
RB2(s′). In particular, the fact that RB1(neg) > RB2(neg) is
not a concern because neg - neg does not hold.
A simple induction (cf. Lemma 64)on the type σ shows that
-σ is compatible with ⊑σ . Furthermore,
Lemma 22. Let B - B′ be expansions of A, α - α′ be
valuations and let M be a positive existential term. Then
BJMK(α) - B′JMK(α′).
7the argument for the latter is not entirely trivial but similar as in Ex. 69(iii)
Consequently, the immediate consequence operator is quasi-
monotone and we conclude:
Theorem 23. If Γ is (A,F)-satisfiable then AΠ |= Γ.
IV. RESOLUTION PROOF SYSTEM
Our resolution proof system is remarkably simple, consist-
ing of only three rules: (i) a higher-order version of the usual
resolution rule [3] between a pair of goal and definite clauses
(thus yielding a goal clause), (ii) a rule for β-reductions
on leftmost (outermost) positions of atoms in goal clauses
and (iii) a rule to refute certain goal clauses which are not
satisfied by the model of the background theory (similar to
[19]).
Resolution
¬RM ∨G G′ ∨Rx
G ∨
(
G′[M/x]
)
β-Reduction
¬(λx. L)M N ∨G
¬L[M/x]N ∨G
Constraint refutation
G ∨ ¬ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ϕn
⊥
provided that each atom in G has the form8 xM , each ϕi is
a background atom and there exists a valuation α such that
A, α |= ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn.
Example 24 (Refutation proof). A refutation of the set of
HoCHCs from Ex. 11 is given in Fig. 2. The last inference
is admissible because for any valuation satisfying α(n) =
α(y) = 1 and α(x) = 2,
ALIA, α |=(n ≥ 1) ∧ (n > 0) ∧ (n− 1 ≤ 0)∧
(n = y) ∧ (x = n+ y) ∧ (x ≤ n+ n).
Since variables are implicitly universally quantified, the
rules have to be applied modulo the renaming of (free)
variables; we write Γ′ ⊢A Γ′ ∪ {G} if G can be thus derived
from the clauses in Γ′ using the above rules and ⊢∗A for the
reflexive, transitive closure of ⊢A.
Proposition 25 (Soundness). Let Γ be a set of HoCHCs.
If Γ ⊢∗A Γ
′ ∪ {⊥} (for some Γ′) then Γ is (A,F)-
unsatisfiable, and this holds even if F is not complete.
Proof sketch. The most interesting case occurs when the con-
straint refutation rule is applied to G :=
∨m
i=1 ¬xiM i ∨∨n
j=1 ¬ϕj . Being of relational type, each variable xi cannot
occur in any ϕj . Thus, modifying witnesses α of A, α |=
ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn to satisfy α′(x) = ⊤ρ for x : ρ ∈ ∆, we
conclude B, α′ 6|= G for all expansions B of A.
Observe that the argument makes use of ⊤ρ ∈ FJρK, which
is a consequence of the comprehension axiom.
The following completeness theorem is significantly more
difficult. In fact, we will not prove it until Sec. IV-D.
8where x is a variable
6
G︷ ︸︸ ︷
¬(n ≥ 1) ∨ ¬ Iter Add nnx ∨ ¬(x ≤ n+ n) D3
Resolution
¬(n ≥ 1) ∨
✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿
¬(n > 0) ∨
✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿
¬ Iter Add n (n− 1) y ∨
✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿
¬Add n y x ∨ ¬(x ≤ n+ n) D1
Resolution
¬(n ≥ 1) ∨ ¬(n > 0) ∨ ¬ Iter Add n (n− 1) y ∨
✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿
¬(x = n+ y) ∨ ¬(x ≤ n+ n) D2
Resolution
¬(n ≥ 1) ∨ ¬(n > 0) ∨
✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿
¬(n− 1 ≤ 0) ∨
✿✿✿✿✿✿✿✿
¬(n = y) ∨ ¬(x = n+ y) ∨ ¬(x ≤ n+ n)
Constraint refutation ⊥
Figure 2. Refutation of the set of HoCHCs from Ex. 11. Atoms involved in resolution steps are shaded; atoms that are added are wavy-underlined.
Theorem 26 (Completeness). If Γ is (A,F)-unsatisfiable then
Γ ⊢∗A {⊥} ∪ Γ
′ for some Γ′.
Consequently, the resolution proof system gives rise to a
semi-decision procedure for the (A,F)-unsatisfiability prob-
lem provided it is (semi-)decidable whether a goal clause of
background atoms is not satisfied by the background theory9.
Outline of the Completeness Proof:
(S1) First, we prove that some goal clause is not satisfied by
the canonical structure already after a finite number of
iterations if Γ is (A,F)-unsatisfiable (Sec. IV-A).
(S2) Consequently, there is a syntactic reason for Γ’s (A,F)-
unsatisfiability (by “unfolding definitions”) (Sec. IV-B).
(S3) Finally, we prove that the “unfolding” actually only
needs to take place at the leftmost (outermost) positions
of atoms (Sec. IV-C), which can be captured by the
resolution proof system (Sec. IV-D).
Observe that Proof Step (S1) is model theoretic / semantic,
whilst Proof Steps (S2) and (S3) are proof theoretic / syntactic.
A. Quasi-Continuity
Whilst in Sec. III we have shown that AΠ is a model of the
definite clauses, we now examine the consequences of AΠ 6|=
G for some goal clause G ∈ Γ. Unlike the 1st-order case [20],
stage ω is not a fixed point of TΠ in general, as the following
example illustrates:
Example 27. Consider the following program:
¬(xR = 0 ∨R (xR − 1)) ∨RxR ¬(xU R) ∨ U xU
where Σ′ = ΣLIA ∪ {R : ι → o, U : ((ι → o) → o) → o},
∆(xR) = ι and ∆(xU ) = (ι→ o)→ o. Let A be the standard
model of Linear Integer ArithmeticALIA and let F = S be the
standard frame. For ease of notation, we introduce functions
rα : SJιK → B such that rα(n) = 1 iff 0 ≤ n < α, and
δα : SJι → oK → B such that δα(r) = 1 iff r = rα, where
α ∈ ω ∪ {ω}. Then it holds RAn = rn, UA0 = ⊥(ι→o)→o
and UAn(s) = s(rn−1) for n > 0. Therefore R
Aω = rω and
UAω (s) = 1 iff there exists n < ω satisfying s(rn) = 1. In
particular, UAω (δω) = 0. On the other hand, U
Aω+1(δω) =
AωJλxU . xU RK(δω) = 1. Consequently, Aω 6= Aω+1.
9i.e. whether there exists a valuation α such that A, α |= ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn
Nonetheless, there still exists a (finite) n ∈ ω satisfying
An 6|= G if AΠ 6|= G (Thm. 32). We make use of a
similar strategy to establishing the canonical model property:
we introduce the notion of quasi-continuity, state a version
of Kleene’s fixed point theorem and prove the immediate
consequence operator to be quasi-continuous.
Definition 28. Let - ⊆ L× L be a relation.
(i) - is --directed if for every a, b ∈ L, a - a and there
exists c ∈ L satisfying a, b - c.
For a ∈ L we write dir-(a) for the set of --directed
subsets D of L satisfying a -
∨
D.
(ii) F is quasi-continuous if for all a ∈ L and D ∈ dir-(a),
F (a) -
∨
b∈D F (b).
Thus, every quasi-continuous function is in particular quasi-
monotone if - is reflexive.
Proposition 29. If - is compatible with ≤ and F is quasi-
continuous then (i) for all ordinals β ≤ β′, aβ - aβ′
and (ii) aF - aω.
Combined with Prop. 17 this yields Kleene’s fixed point
theorem in the case of - := ≤.
Similarly as in Sec. III, we need relations -σ ⊆ FJσK ×
FJσK which behave well with applications in order for
the immediate consequence operator to be quasi-continuous.
Therefore, we stipulate (overloading the notation of Sec. III):
Definition 30. We define -σ ⊆ FJσK×FJσK by recursion
on the type σ:
b -o b
′ := b ≤ b′ (b, b′ ∈ FJoK)
n -ι n
′ := n = n′ (n, n′ ∈ FJιK)
r -τ→σ r
′ := ∀s ∈ FJτK,S′ ∈ dir-τ (s).
r(s) -σ
⊔
s′∈S′ r
′(s′) (r, r′ ∈ FJτ → σK)
There is an elementary inductive argument (cf. Lemma 68)
that each -σ is compatible with ⊑σ. We lift - to structures
and valuations in a pointwise way, and abbreviate dir- as dir.
Lemma 31. Let M be a positive existential term, B be an
expansion of A, B′ ∈ dir(B), α be a valuation and let a′ ∈
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dir(α). Then10
BJMK(α) -
⊔
B′∈B′,α′∈a′
B′JMK(α′). (1)
Consequently, the immediate consequence operator is quasi-
continuous. Moreover, by Prop. 29, for closed positive ex-
istential formulas F , AΠJF K ≤ maxn∈ω AnJF K. Therefore,
we get the following result, which is key for the refutational
completeness of the proof system.
Theorem 32. Let G be a goal clause. If AΠ 6|= G then there
exists n ∈ ω such that An 6|= G.
B. Syntactic Unfolding
Having established Proof Step (S1), we study a functional
relation →‖ on positive existential terms, which is a syntactic
counterpart of the immediate consequence operator. Essen-
tially11, it holds M →‖ N if N is obtained from M by
replacing all occurrences of symbolsR ∈ Σ′\Σ with λxR. FR,
which is reminiscent of the definition of RTΠ(B). Therefore:
Proposition 33. Let B be an expansion of A and let M and
N be positive existential terms satisfying M →‖ N . Then for
all valuations α, TΠ(B)JMK(α) = BJNK(α).
A similar idea is exploited in [16].
Next, let υ := {(R, λxR. FR) | R ∈ Σ′\Σ} and βυ := β∪υ.
Besides, let →βυ be the compatible closure [15, p. 51] of βυ.
It is easy to see that →‖ ⊆։βυ , where ։βυ is the reflexive,
transitive closure of →βυ.
C. Leftmost (Outermost) Reduction
There is an important mismatch between the relation →βυ
and the rules of the proof system: in contrast to the former, the
latter only take leftmost (outermost) positions of atoms into
account. Fortunately, arbitrary sequences of βυ-reductions can
be mimicked by sequences which are standard in the sense that
purely leftmost reductions are followed by purely non-leftmost
ones (Cor. 35).
Fig. 3 defines
·
−→
ℓ
and −→s , which formalise leftmost (outer-
most) and standard reductions, respectively. We write M −→
ℓ
N if M
m
−→
ℓ
N for some m, where m corresponds to the
number of leftmost βυ-reductions having been performed. The
idea is that L −→s N if for some M , L −→ℓ M and we can
obtain N from M by performing standard βυ-reductions only
on non-leftmost positions.
Lemma 34. If K −→s M →βυ N then K −→s N .
The proof of this proposition is very similar to the proof of
the standardisation theorem in the λ-calculus as presented in
[10] and relies on the insight that if all of K −→s M , K
′ −→s M
′
and O −→s Q hold then K
′[O/x]K −→s M
′[Q/x]M .
10By Remark 8(i) the right-hand side is well-defined.
11For a formal definition refer to Fig. 5 in App. C2.
Corollary 35. LetM and N be positive existential terms such
that M ։βυ N . Then M −→s N .
Next, we consider the relation ⊲ on positive existential
formulas and valuations inductively defined by:
α ⊲ xM
A, α |= ϕ
α ⊲ ϕ
r ∈ FJ∆(x)K α[x 7→ r] ⊲M
α ⊲ ∃x.M
i ∈ {1, 2} α ⊲Mi
α ⊲M1 ∨M2
α ⊲M1 α ⊲M2
α ⊲M1 ∧M2
Intuitively, α ⊲ F if for some α′ (agreeing with α on∆−1(ι)),
A0, α′ |= F and there are no λ-abstractions in relevant
leftmost positions.
Remark 36. If G is a goal clause and α ⊲ posex(G) (for
some α) then G has the form
∨m
i=1 ¬xiM i ∨
∨n
j=1 ¬ϕj and
G can be refuted by the constraint refutation rule in one step.
Lemma 37. Let G be a goal clause, F be a β-normal positive
existential formula and α be a valuation such that A0, α |= F
and posex(G) −→s F . Then there exists a positive existential
formula F ′ satisfying posex(G) −→
ℓ
F ′ and α ⊲ F ′.
D. Concluding Refutational Completeness
Finally, we establish a connection between the (abstract)
relation −→
ℓ
on positive existential terms and the resolution
proof system on clauses. We define a function µ assigning
natural numbers or ω to positive existential formulas E by
µ(E) := min
(
{ω} ∪ {m | E
m
−→
ℓ
F and α ⊲ F for some α}
)
which is extended to non-empty sets Γ′ of HoCHCs by
µ(Γ′) := min{µ(posex(G)) | G ∈ Γ}.
We can use the resolution proof system to derive a set of
HoCHCs Γ′′ with a strictly smaller measure by simulating a
1
−→
ℓ
-reduction step:
Proposition 38. Let Γ′ ⊇ Γ be a set of HoCHCs satisfying
0 < µ(Γ′) < ω. Then there exists Γ′′ ⊇ Γ satisfying Γ′ ⊢A Γ′′
and µ(Γ′′) < µ(Γ′).
Example 39. Consider the HoCHCs Γ = {¬(xR ≥ 5) ∨
RxR,¬R (xR − 5) ∨ RxR,¬R 5}. It holds that R 5
1
−→
ℓ
(λxR. xR ≥ 5 ∨ R (xR − 5)) 5
1
−→
ℓ
5 ≥ 5 ∨ R (5 − 5)
and µ(Γ) = 2. Furthermore, Γ ⊢A Γ ∪ {¬5 ≥ 5} and
µ(Γ ∪ {¬5 ≥ 5}) = 0.
Combining everything, we finally obtain:
Theorem 26 (Completeness). If Γ is (A,F)-unsatisfiable then
Γ ⊢∗A {⊥} ∪ Γ
′ for some Γ′.
Proof. By Cor. 18, AΠ |= D for all definite clauses D ∈ Γ.
Since Γ is (A,F)-unsatisfiable there exists a goal clause G ∈
Γ satisfyingAΠ 6|= G. By Thm. 32 there exists n ∈ ω such that
An 6|= G. Let Fn be such that posex(G)→n‖ Fn (where →
n
‖
is the n-fold composition of →‖). By Prop. 33, A0, α |= Fn
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RM
1
−→
ℓ
(λxR. FR)M
R ∈ Σ′ \ Σ
(λx. L)M N
1
−→
ℓ
L[M/x]N
M1
m1−−→
ℓ
N1 M2
m2−−→
ℓ
N2
M1 ◦M2
m1+m2−−−−−→
ℓ
N1 ◦N2
◦ ∈ {∧,∨}
M
m
−→
ℓ
N
∃x.M
m
−→
ℓ
∃x.N M
0
−→
ℓ
M
L
m1−−→
ℓ
M M
m2−−→
ℓ
N
L
m1+m2−−−−−→
ℓ
N
(a) Definition of leftmost (outermost) reductions.
M −→s N
L −→s cN
L −→
ℓ
cM, c ∈ Σ′ ∪ {∧,∨, ∃τ}
M −→s N
L −→s xN
L −→
ℓ
xM
M ′ −→s N
′ M −→s N
L −→s (λx.N
′)N
L −→
ℓ
(λx.M ′)M
.
(b) Definition of standard reductions (by M −→s N we mean Mj −→s Nj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, assuming M is M1, . . . ,Mn and N is N1, . . . , Nn).
Figure 3. Leftmost outermost and standard reductions.
(for any α as Fn is closed). Let F
′
n be the β-normal form
of Fn. By Cor. 35 and Lemma 37 there exists F
′ such that
posex(G) −→
ℓ
F ′ and α ⊲ F ′. Consequently, µ(Γ) < ω. By
Prop. 38 there exists Γ′ ⊇ Γ satisfying Γ ⊢∗A Γ
′ and µ(Γ′) = 0.
Hence, there exists G ∈ Γ′ and α such that posex(G)
0
−→
ℓ
F ′
and α ⊲ F ′. Clearly, this implies F ′ = posex(G), and by
Remark 36, Γ ⊢∗A Γ
′ ⊢A {⊥} ∪ Γ′.
E. Compactness of HoCHC
The reason why we restrict Γ to be finite is to achieve
correspondence with programs (Def. 13), which are finite
expressions. If we simply extend programs with infinitary
disjunctions (but keep HoCHCs finitary) we can carry out
exactly the same reasoning to derive that also every infinite,
(A,F)-unsatisfiable set of HoCHCs can be refuted in the proof
system. Consequently:
Theorem 40 (Compactness). For every (A,F)-unsatisfiable
set Γ of HoCHCs there exists a finite subset Γ′ ⊆ Γ which is
(A,F)-unsatisfiable.
V. SEMANTIC INVARIANCE
[1] details an explicit translation between standard and
monotone models of HoCHCs, thus yielding the equivalence
of A-standard- and A-monotone-satisfiability.
As a consequence of the Completeness Thm. 26 for the
proof system, (A,F)-unsatisfiability for any complete frame
F implies the existence of a refutation, which in turn entails
(A,F ′)-unsatisfiability for any frame F ′ by the Soundness
Prop. 25.
Therefore, exploiting Ex. 5, we obtain an equivalence result
encompassing a much wider class of semantics:
Theorem 41 (Semantic Invariance). Let Γ be a set of
HoCHCs. Then the following are equivalent:
(i) Γ is A-standard-satisfiable,
(ii) Γ is A-Henkin-satisfiable,
(iii) Γ is A-monotone-satisfiable,
(iv) Γ is A-continuous-satisfiable,
(v) Γ is (A,F)-satisfiable, where F is a complete frame
expanding A.
Thus, we call a set of Γ of HoCHCs A-satisfiable if it
satisfies any of the equivalent conditions of Thm. 41.
VI. COMPACT THEORIES
In this section, we extend our results to background theories
(over Σ) with a set A of models (i.e. Σ-structures), calling a
set of HoCHCs A-satisfiable if it is A-satisfiable for some
A ∈ A. Otherwise it is A-unsatisfiable.
Observe that the Completeness Thm. 26 critically relies
on the observation that A-unsatisfiability can be traced back
to the failure of a single goal clause of background atoms
(manifested in the constraint refutation rule). Therefore, it is
natural to generalise constraint refutation to a rule refuting sets
of A-unsatisfiable12 goal clauses of background atoms:
Comp. const.
refutation
G1 ∨
∨m1
i=1 ¬ϕ1,i . . . Gn ∨
∨mn
i=1 ¬ϕn,i
⊥
provided that each atom in each Gi has the form xM , each
ϕi,j is a background atom and {¬ϕj,1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ϕj,mj | 1 ≤
j ≤ n} is A-unsatisfiable.
and let ⊢A be defined accordingly. However, to match the
rule’s finitary nature, A needs to be restricted a little:
Definition 42. A set A of 1st-order Σ-structures is compact
if for all A-unsatisfiable sets Γ of goal clauses of background
atoms there exists a finite Γ′ ⊆ Γ which is A-unsatisfiable.
In particular, every finite A is compact. Then we obtain:
Theorem 43 (Soundness and Completeness). Let A be a
compact set of Σ-structures and Γ be a set of HoCHCs. Then
Γ is A-unsatisfiable iff Γ ⊢∗
A
Γ′ ∪ {⊥} for some Γ′.
As an interesting special case, this shows that the proof
system is also sound and complete in the unconstrained
setting: by the compactness theorem for 1st-order logic the set
12Note that for a set Γ of goal clauses of background atoms, A-satisfiability
is in essence not about the existence of A ∈ A and an expansion B of A
such that B |= Γ but only about the existence of A ∈ A such that A |= Γ.
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of 1st-order Σ-structures (possibly interpreting (in-)equality
symbols as (non-)identity) is compact. Consequently, there
does not exist a Σ′-structure B (interpreting (in-)equality as
(non-)identity) satisfying B |= Γ iff Γ is refutable.
VII. 1ST-ORDER TRANSLATION
It is folklore that there is a 1st-order translation of higher-
order logic which is sound and complete for Henkin semantics
(see e.g. [21-23]). The essence of the technique is to replace all
symbols by constants (of a base type) and encode application
using dedicated binary function symbols.
For the reasons discussed in the introduction this translation
is however not in general complete for standard semantics.
In this section, we present a particularly simple 1st-order
translation of HoCHC which is sound and complete even for
standard semantics. Fortunately, the target fragment is still
semi-decidable.
We do not need to consider HoCHCs containing λ-
abstractions because they can be eliminated by a logical
counterpart of λ-lifting [24] (i.e. introducing new relational
symbols and adding appropriate “definitions” for them, see
App. E1 and Cor. 79). This constitutes a considerable gen-
eralisation of the “polarity-dependent renaming” for 1st-order
logic [25], [26].
Therefore, the following is without loss of generality:
Assumption. Henceforth, we fix a finite set Γ of HoCHCs
which does not contain λ-abstractions and a set A of 1st-
order Σ-structures.
Let I = {ι} ∪ {⌊ρ⌋ | ρ relational} (and we set ⌊ιn → ι⌋ :=
ιn → ι). Clearly, we can regard Σ and each A ∈ A as a 1st-
order signature and structure, respectively, over the extended
set of types of individuals.
We assume a type environment ⌊∆⌋ such that for x : τ ∈ ∆,
⌊∆⌋(x) = ⌊τ⌋ and define ⌊Σ′⌋ to be the following 1st-order
extension of Σ:
Σ ∪ {cR : ⌊ρ⌋ | R : ρ ∈ Σ
′ \ Σ}
∪ {cρ : ⌊ρ⌋ | ρ relational}
∪ {@τ,ρ : ⌊τ → ρ⌋ → ⌊τ⌋ → ⌊ρ⌋ | τ → ρ relational}
∪ {H : ⌊o⌋ → o}
To reduce clutter, we often omit the subscripts from @.
Intuitively, @ encodes application, relational symbols R ∈
Σ′ \ Σ become constants cR, H maps the “bogus booleans“
⌊o⌋ to o and the following comprehension axiom Compρ (for
relational ρ = τ1 → · · · → τn → o) asserts the existence of
an element (the interpretation of cρ) corresponding to ⊤ρ:
Compρ := H (@ (· · · (@ (@ cρ x1)x2) · · · )xn)
where the xi are distinct variables of type ⌊τi⌋.
For a Σ′-term M containing neither logical symbols nor
λ-abstractions, we define ⌊M⌋′ by structural recursion:
⌊x⌋′ := x
⌊R⌋′ := cR if R ∈ Σ
′ \ Σ
⌊cN⌋′ := cN if c ∈ Σ
⌊M N N ′⌋′ := @ ⌊M N⌋′ ⌊N ′⌋′ if M 6∈ Σ
Thus, terms of the background theory are unchanged by ⌊·⌋′
and by Remark 2, for each Σ′-term ∆ ⊢M : σ which is not a
background atom, ⌊∆⌋ ⊢ ⌊M⌋′ : ⌊σ⌋. The following operator
⌊·⌋ ensures that also foreground atoms have type o (not ⌊o⌋)
⌊A⌋ :=
{
A if A = cN with c ∈ Σ
H ⌊A⌋′ otherwise (A is a foreground atom).
and we lift ⌊·⌋ to HoCHCs by
⌊(¬)A1 ∨ · · · ∨ (¬)An⌋ := (¬)⌊A1⌋ ∨ · · · ∨ (¬)⌊An⌋
Finally, for Γ we set
⌊Γ⌋ := {⌊C⌋ | C ∈ Γ} ∪ {Compρ | x : ρ ∈ ∆ occurs in Γ}.
Note that ⌊Γ⌋ is a finite set of 1st-order Horn clauses13 of the
(1st-order) language of ⌊Σ′⌋.
Example 44 (1st-order translation ⌊·⌋). Consider again the set
Γ of HoCHCs from Ex. 11. Applying the translation ⌊·⌋ to Γ
we get the 1st-order clauses in Fig. 4.
For A ∈ A and a Σ′-expansion B of A, let ⌊B⌋ be the
1st-order ⌊Σ⌋-expansion of A defined by
⌊B⌋J⌊ρ⌋K := BJρK c
⌊B⌋
R := R
B c
⌊B⌋
ρ := ⊤ρ
@
⌊B⌋
τ,ρ′(r)(s) := r(s) H
⌊B⌋(b) := b
for relational ρ and τ → ρ′, R ∈ Σ′ \ Σ, r ∈ ⌊B⌋J⌊τ → ρ′⌋K,
s ∈ ⌊B⌋J⌊τ⌋K and b ∈ ⌊B⌋J⌊o⌋K = B. It is easy to see that
B |= Γ implies ⌊B⌋ |= ⌊Γ⌋. Consequently:
Proposition 45. If Γ is A-satisfiable then ⌊Γ⌋ is A-satisfiable.
Conversely, applications of the (higher-order) resolution rule
can be matched by 1st-order resolution inferences between
the corresponding translated clauses. Besides, the 1st-order
translation contains comprehension axioms Compρ, which
complements the instantiation of relational variables with ⊤ρ
in the proof of the Soundness Prop. 25. Therefore, we obtain:
Lemma 46. Let Γ′ be a set of HoCHCs not containing λ-
abstractions and suppose Γ′ ⊢A Γ′ ∪ {G}. Then
(i) G does not contain λ-abstractions
(ii) if G 6= ⊥ then ⌊Γ′⌋ |= ⌊Γ′ ∪ {G}⌋
(iii) if G = ⊥ then ⌊Γ′⌋ is A-unsatisfiable.
By the Completeness Thm. 43 we conclude:
13in the standard sense
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⌊D1⌋ = ¬(z = x+ y) ∨H (@ (@ (@ Add x) y) z)
⌊D2⌋ = ¬(n ≤ 0) ∨ ¬(s = x) ∨H (@ (@ (@ (@ Iter f) s)n)x)
⌊D3⌋ = ¬(n > 0) ∨ ¬H (@ (@ (@ (@ Iter f) s) (n− 1)) y) ∨ ¬H (@ (@ (@ f n) y)x) ∨H (@ (@ (@ (@ Iter f) s)n)x)
⌊G⌋ = ¬(n ≥ 1) ∨ ¬H (@ (@ (@ (@ Iter Add)n)n)x) ∨ ¬(x ≤ n+ n)
Compι3→o = H (@ (@ (@ cι3→o x1)x2)x3)
Figure 4. 1st-order translation of the set of HoCHCs of Ex. 11.
Corollary 47. If A is compact and Γ is A-unsatisfiable then
⌊Γ⌋ is A-unsatisfiable.
Theorem 48. Assuming that A is compact, Γ is A-satisfiable
iff ⌊Γ⌋ is A-satisfiable.
It is remarkable that our translation does not require exten-
sionality axioms and only a very restricted form of compre-
hension axioms (cf. [6]).
Finally, if A is compact, definable14 and A-unsatisfiability
of goal clauses of background atoms is semi-decidable, then
A-unsatisfiability of ⌊Γ⌋ is also semi-decidable [19, Thm. 24].
VIII. DECIDABLE FRAGMENTS
Satisfiability of HoCHC is undecidable in general because
already its 1st-order fragments are undecidable for Linear
Integer Arithmetic [27], [28] or the unconstrained setting15
[29].
Remark 49. Despite these negative results, A-satisfiability of
finite Γ is decidable if A is a finite set of Σ-structures such
that for each A ∈ A and type σ, AJσK is finite. This is a
consequence of Thm. 23 and the fact that we can compute
each AΠΓ explicitly and check whether AΠΓ |= Γ holds.
Thanks to this insight, we have identified two decidable
fragments of HoCHC, one of which is presented as follows;
we leave the other (higher-order Datalog) to App. F1.
A. Combining the Bernays-Schönfinkel-Ramsey Fragment of
HoCHC with Simple Linear Integer Arithmetic
Some authors [30], [31] have studied 1st-order clauses
without function symbols (the so-called Bernays-Schönfinkel-
Ramsey class16) extended with a restricted form of Linear
Integer Arithmetic. The fragment enjoys the attractive property
that every clause set is equi-satisfiable with a finite set of its
ground instances, which implies decidability [30], [31].
In this section, we transfer this result to our higher-order
Horn setting.
14or term-generated [19], i.e. for every A ∈ A and a ∈ AJιK there exists
a closed Σ-term M such that AJMK = a
15i.e. the background theory imposes no restriction at all
16Precisely the set of sentences that, when written in prenex normal form,
have a ∃∗∀∗-quantifier prefix and contain no function symbols.
Assumption. Let Σ be a (1st-order) signature extending ΣLIA
with constant symbols c : ι, and let Σ′ ⊇ Σ be a relational
extension of Σ.
Definition 50. (i) A Σ-atom is simple if it has the form x ≤
M , M ≤ x or x ≤ y, where M is closed17.
(ii) A HoCHC is a higher-order simple linear arithmetic
Bernays-Schönfinkel-RamseyHorn clause (HoBHC(SLA))
if it has the form ¬ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ϕn ∨ C, where each ϕi
is a simple (linear arithmetic) background atom and C is
⊥ or it does not contain symbols from Σ.
Note that we could also have allowed background atoms of
the form M ⊳N , x ⊳M and x E y, where M,N are closed,
⊳ ∈ {<,≤,=, 6=,≥, >} and E ∈ {≤,=,≥} [31].
Example 51. Let Σ = ΣLIA ∪ {c, d : ι}, Σ′ = Σ ∪ {R : ι→
o, U : (ι → o) → ι → o}, ∆(x) = ∆(y) = ∆(z) = ι and
∆(f) = ι→ o. The following is a set of HoBHC(SLA):
¬(x ≤ c+ d− 5) ∨Rx
¬f x ∨ ¬(y ≤ x) ∨ ¬(x ≤ d) ∨ U f y
¬(c ≤ x) ∨ ¬(x ≤ −1)
¬(x ≤ d− 5) ∨ ¬(d− 5 ≤ x) ∨ ¬(y ≤ c− 10)∨
¬(c− 10 ≤ y) ∨ ¬U (λz.Rx) y.
Assumption. Let A be the set of Σ-expansions of ALIA and
let Γ be a finite set of HoBHC(SLA).
As in the 1st-order case, only the relations between ground
terms are relevant. Therefore, we replace ground termsM with
(fresh) constant symbols cM and consider only structures in
which “≤” is interpreted consistently (with the meaning of the
constants).
Formally, let gtι(Γ) be the set of closed terms of type ι
occurring in Γ and we define
Σ♭ := {≤ : ι→ ι→ o} ∪ {cM : ι |M ∈ gtι(Γ)}
(Σ′)♭ := Σ♭ ∪ (Σ′ \ Σ)
For A ∈ A, let A♭ be the 1-order Σ♭-structure defined by
A♭JιK := gtι(Γ) ≤
A♭(M)(N) := AJM ≤ NK cA
♭
M :=M
for M,N ∈ gtι(Γ), and let A
♭ := {A♭ | A ∈ A}.
17or ground because atoms do not contain (existential) quantifiers by
definition
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Furthermore, for simple atoms x ≤M and M ≤ x, we set
(x ≤M)♭ := x ≤ cM and (M ≤ x)
♭ := cM ≤ x. For all other
atoms A (i.e. x ≤ y or foreground atoms) we set A♭ := A; we
lift ·♭ in the obvious way to clauses18 and define Γ♭ := {C♭ |
C ∈ Γ}. Note that Γ♭ is a set of HoCHCs for Σ♭ and (Σ′)♭,
and that A♭ is finite.
Clearly, there is an inverse ·♯ of ·♭ on formulas, e.g.
satisfying (x ≤ cM )♯ = (x ≤M).
Now, suppose A ∈ A. Then valuations α over (a frame
induced by) A♭JιK naturally correspond to valuations α♯ over
AJιK by evaluating ground terms19 and it holds AJϕK(α♯) =
A♭Jϕ♭K(α) for simple background atoms ϕ.
Conversely, for valuations α and α♭ (over AJιK and A♭JιK,
respectively) satisfying
α♭(x) =

argmaxM∈gtι(Γ)AJMK
argminM∈gtι(Γ)∧AJMK≥α(x)AJMK
if {M ∈ gtι(Γ) | AJMK ≥ α(x)} = ∅
otherwise
for x : ι ∈ ∆, it holds AJϕK(α) ≤ A♭Jϕ♭K(α♭) if gtι(ϕ) ⊆
gtι(Γ). Therefore:
Lemma 52. Let Γ′ be a set of goal clauses of simple
background atoms satisfying gtι(Γ
′) ⊆ gtι(Γ).
Then Γ′ is A-satisfiable iff (Γ′)♭ is A♭-satisfiable.
Lemma 53. Let Γ′ be a set of HoBHC(SLA) satisfying
gtι(Γ
′) ⊆ gtι(Γ). Then
(i) Γ′ ⊢A Γ′ ∪ {G} implies (Γ′)♭ ⊢A♭ (Γ
′)♭ ∪ {G♭}
(ii) (Γ′)♭ ⊢A♭ (Γ
′)♭ ∪ {G} implies Γ′ ⊢A Γ′ ∪ {G♯}.
The proof of the Completeness Thm. 43 can be strengthened
(Thm. 87 in App. F2) to yield:
Proposition 54. If Γ is A-unsatisfiable then Γ ⊢∗
A
Γ′ ∪ {⊥}
for some Γ′.
Consequently, if Γ is A-unsatisfiable then Γ ⊢∗
A
Γ′ ∪ {⊥}
for some Γ′. It is easy to see that sets Γ′ of HoBHC(SLA)
satisfying gtι(Γ
′) ⊆ gtι(Γ) are closed under the rules of the
proof system (Lemma 86). Hence, by Lemma 53(i), Γ♭ ⊢∗
A♭
(Γ′)♭ ∪ {⊥} and therefore by soundness (Prop. 25), Γ♭ is A♭-
unsatisfiable.
The converse can be derived similarly and we conclude:
Proposition 55. Γ is A-satisfiable iff Γ♭ is A♭-satisfiable.
Finally, A♭, which is finite, can be effectively obtained as
a result of the decidability of Linear Integer Arithmetic (or
Presburger arithmetic) [32]. Moreover, for every A♭ ∈ A♭
and type σ, A♭JσK is finite. Hence, by Remark 49, we obtain:
Theorem 56. Let Γ be a finite set of HoBHC(SLA). It is
decidable if there is a Σ′-expansion B of ALIA satisfying
18i.e. (¬A1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬An ∨ (¬)A)♭ := ¬A♭1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬A
♭
n ∨ (¬)A
♭
19precisely, α♯(x) = AJα(x)K for x : ι ∈ ∆
B |= Γ.
IX. RELATED WORK
a) Higher-order Automated Theorem Proving: There is
a long history of resolution-based procedures for higher-order
logic without background theories which are refutationally
complete for Henkin semantics e.g. [11-14]. Furthermore,
a tableau-style proof system has been proposed [33]. Their
completeness proofs construct countable Henkin models out
of terms in case the proof system is unable to refute a problem.
Hence, these proofs do not seem to be extendable to provide
standard models when restricted to HoCHCs.
Furthermore, there are efforts to extend SMT solvers to
higher-order logic [34], [35] but the techniques seem to be
incomplete even for Henkin semantics.
b) Theorem Proving for 1st-order Logic Modulo The-
ories: In the 1990s, superposition [36]—the basis of most
state-of-the-art theorem provers [37], [38]—was extended to a
setting with background theories [19], [39]. The proof system
is sound and complete, assuming a compact background
theory and some technical conditions. Abstractly, their proof
system is very similar to ours: there is a clear separation
between logical / foreground reasoning and reasoning in the
background theory. Moreover, the search is directed purely by
the former whilst the latter is only used in a final step to check
satisfiability of a conjunction of theory atoms.
c) Defunctionalisation: Our translation to 1st-order lo-
gic (Sec. VII) resembles Reynolds’ defunctionalisation [40].
A whole-program transformation, defunctionalisation reduces
higher-order functional programs to 1st-order ones. It elim-
inates higher-order features, such as partial applications and
λ-abstractions, by storing arguments in data types and re-
covering them in an application function, which performs a
matching on the data type.
Recently, the approach was adapted to the satisfiability prob-
lem for HoCHC [41] and implemented in the tool DefMono20:
given a set of HoCHCs, it generates an equi-satisfiable set of
1st-order Horn clauses over the original background theory
and additionally the theory of data types. By contrast, our
translation is purely logical, directly yielding 1st-order Horn
clauses, without recourse to inductive data types.
d) Extensional Higher-order Logic Programming: The
aim of higher-order logic programming is not only to establish
satisfiability of a set of Horn clauses without background the-
ories but also to find (representatives of) “answers to queries”,
i.e. witnesses that goal clauses are falsified in every model
of the definite clauses. Thus, [16] proposes a rather complic-
ated domain-theoretic semantics (equivalent to the continuous
semantics [16, Prop. 5.14]). They design a resolution-based
proof system that supports a strong notion of completeness
([16, Thm. 7.38]) with respect to this semantics.
20see http://mjolnir.cs.ox.ac.uk/dfhochc/
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Their proof system is more complicated because it operates
on more general formulas (which are nonetheless translatable
to clauses). Moreover it requires the instantiation of variables
with certain terms, which we avoid by implicitly instantiating
all remaining relational variables with ⊤ρ in the constraint
refutation rule.
e) Refinement Type Assignments: [1] also introduces a
refinement type system, the aim of which is to automate the
search for models. In this respect, the approach is orthogonal
to our resolution proof system, which can be used to refute all
unsatisfiable problems (but might fail on satisfiable instances).
However, for satisfiable clause sets the method by [1], which
is implemented in the tool Horus21, may also be unable to
generate models.
X. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In sum, HoCHC lies at a “sweet spot” in higher-order logic,
semantically robust and useful for algorithmic verification.
Future work: We expect that our proof system’s robust-
ness on satisfiable instances can be improved by tightening the
rules (cf. Sec. IX) or combining it with a search for models
[1], [42], [43]. Crucially, soundness and completeness even
for standard semantics can be retained thanks to HoCHC’s
semantic invariance. To facilitate comparison of approaches,
it would also be important to obtain an implementation of our
techniques and conduct an empirical evaluation.
On the more theoretical side it would be interesting to
identify extensions of HoCHC sharing its excellent properties.
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APPENDIX
A. Supplementary Materials for Sec. II
1) Supplementary Materials for Sec. II-A: The following
lemma is completely standard and can be proven by a routine
structural induction (exploiting the variable convention).
Lemma 57 (Substitution). Let F be a pre-frame, A be a
(Σ,F)-structure and α be a (∆,F)-valuation. Furthermore,
let x ∈ dom(∆) and letM and N be terms such that ∆ ⊢ N :
∆(x). Then AJM [N/x]K(α) = AJMK(α[x 7→ AJNK(α)]).
The following lemma states that in frames, the denotation
is stable under β- and η-conversion.
Lemma 58. Let F be a frame, let M and M ′ be Σ-terms, A
be a (Σ,F)-structure and let α be a (∆,F)-valuation. Then
(i) if M →β M ′ then AJMK(α) = AJM ′K(α);
(ii) if M →η M ′ then AJMK(α) = AJM ′K(α).
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the compat-
ible closure. The only interesting cases are the base cases
((λx.N)N ′, N [N ′/x]) ∈ β and (λy. L y, L) ∈ η, respect-
ively. Then
AJ(λx.N)N ′K(α) = AJNK(α[x 7→ AJN ′K(α)])
= AJN [N ′/x]K(α)
because of the fact that F is a frame and Lemma 57, and
AJλy. LyK(α) = λr ∈ FJ∆(y)K.AJLK(α)(r) = AJLK(α)
because F is a frame.
2) Supplementary Materials for Sec. II-C: Let Γ be a finite
set of HoCHCs. W.l.o.g. we can assume that for each R ∈
Σ′ \ Σ there is at least one Horn clause G ∨ RxR and each
definite clause has this form.
For a goal clause G = ¬A1∨· · ·∨¬An let posex(G, V ) :=
∃y1, . . . , ym. A1 ∧ · · · ∧An, where {y1, . . . , ym} = fv(G) \V
and posex(G) := posex(G, ∅). Clearly, posex(G) is a positive
existential closed formula. Let ΠΓ be the set of definite
formulas
¬(posex(GR,1, xR) ∨ · · · ∨ posex(GR,n, xR)) ∨RxR,
where GR,1 ∨ RxR, . . . , GR,n ∨ RxR are the unnegated
occurrences of RxR in Γ and R ∈ Σ′ \ Σ. Clearly, ΠΓ is a
program. Furthermore, the following is obvious by definition:
Lemma 59. Let Γ be a finite set of HoCHCs, F a frame and
B a (Σ′,F)-expansion of A.
Then B |= {D ∈ Γ | D definite} iff B |= ΠΓ.
3) S,M and C are Complete Frames: First, note that - (as
defined in Def. 30) and ⊑ coincide for the continuous frame.
Lemma 60. Let ⊑ be the pointwise ordering on C and - be
the relation defined in Def. 30. Then - = ⊑.
Proof. We prove by induction on σ that -σ = ⊑σ . For ι
and o this is obvious. Hence, suppose σ = τ → σ′ and let
r, r′ ∈ CJτ → σ′K.
First, suppose r - r′. Let s ∈ CJτK be arbitrary. By the
inductive hypothesis, s - s (⊑ is reflexive). Thus, {s} ∈
dir-(s) and therefore, r(s) - r
′(s). Again by the inductive
hypothesis, r(s) ⊑ r′(s). Consequently, r ⊑ r′.
Conversely, suppose r ⊑ r′. Let s ∈ CJτK and S′ ∈ dir-(s)
be arbitrary. By the inductive hypothesis, s ⊑
⊔
S′ and S′ is
⊑-directed. Hence,
r(s) ⊑ r
(⊔
S
′
)
⊑ r′
(⊔
S
′
)
=
⊔
s′∈S′
r′(s′)
exploiting the monotonicity of r, the continuity of r′ and the
fact that r ⊑ r′. Again by the inductive hypothesis, r(s) -⊔
s′∈S′ r
′(s′). Therefore, r - r′.
Lemma 61. Let Σ be a signature, ∆ be a type environment
and B be a (Σ, C)-structure. Then for any positive existential
term M , (∆, C)-valuation α and a′ ∈ dir-(α),
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(i) if M is a λ-abstraction ∆ ⊢ λx.M ′ : τ → ρ then for
every s ∈ BJτK, BJMK(α)(s) = BJM ′K(α[x 7→ s]), and
(ii) BJMK(α) -
⊔
α′∈a′ BJMK(α
′).
Proof. We prove both parts of the lemma simultaneously by
induction on the structure of M . For all cases except λ-
abstractions, Part (i) is trivially true and Part (ii) is proven
as in Lemma 31.
Hence, suppose M is a λ-abstraction ∆ ⊢ λx.M ′ : τ → ρ.
We define r := λs ∈ BJτK.BJM ′K(α[x 7→ s])
Claim 1. r ∈ BJτ → ρK = CJτ → ρK.
Proof. First, let s, s′ ∈ BJτK be such that s ⊑ s′. By the
reflexivity of ⊑ and Lemma 60, {α[x 7→ s′]} ∈ dir-(α[x 7→
s]). Hence, by the inductive hypothesis,
r(s) = BJM ′K(α[x 7→ s]) - BJM ′K(α[x 7→ s′]) = r(s′)
Consequently by Lemma 60, r(s) ⊑ r(s′) and r is monotone.
Next, suppose that S ⊆ BJτK is ⊑-directed. Note that by
Lemma 60 and the reflexivity of ⊑, {α[x 7→ s] | s ∈ S} ∈
dir-(α[x 7→
⊔
S]). Therefore, by the inductive hypothesis
r
(⊔
S
)
= BJM ′K
(
α
[
x 7→
⊔
S
])
-
⊔
s∈S
BJM ′K(α[x 7→ s]) =
⊔
s∈S
r(s)
Again by Lemma 60, r(
⊔
S) ⊑
⊔
s∈S r(s). Furthermore, by
monotonicity of r, for every s ∈ S, r(s) ⊑ r(
⊔
S). Con-
sequently, by the antisymmetry of ⊑, r(
⊔
S) =
⊔
s∈S r(s).
This concludes the proof of the claim that r : BJτK → BJρK
is continuous. 
As a consequence of Claim 1, for every s ∈ BJτK,
BJMK(α)(s) = BJM ′K(α[x 7→ s]) and the same argument as
in the proof of Lemma 31 can be used to demonstrate Part (ii)
of the lemma.
Similarly, we get the following for the monotone frame
Lemma 62. (i) - = ⊑, where ⊑ be the pointwise ordering
on M and - is the relation defined in Def. 19;
(ii) If Σ is a signature, ∆ is a type environment, B is a
(Σ,M)-structure, α is a (∆,M)-valuation,∆ ⊢ λx.M :
τ → ρ is a positive existential Σ-term and s ∈ BJτK then
BJMK(α)(s) = BJM ′K(α[x 7→ s]).
Lemmas 61 and 62 immediately imply the following (com-
pleteness is trivial):
Proposition 63. S, M and C are complete frames.
B. Supplementary Materials for Sec. III
Proposition 17. (i) F (aF ) ≤ aF and (ii) if - is compatible
with ≤, F is quasi-monotone and b ∈ L satisfies F (b) ≤ b
then aF - b.
Proof. Since, L is a set (in contrast to On) there exists β ∈
On satisfying aF = aβ .
(i) Thus, F (aF ) = aβ+1 ≤ aF .
(ii) By what we have just shown it suffices to prove by
transfinite induction on β that aβ - b.
• First, suppose β = β˜ + 1 is a successor ordinal. By
the inductive hypothesis and quasi-monotonicity of F ,
aβ = F (aβ˜) - F (b) ≤ b. Consequently by (C1), aβ -
b.
• Otherwise, β is a limit ordinal and by the inductive
hypothesis, a
β˜
- b for all β˜ < β. Consequently, by
(C2), aβ - b.
Lemma 64. - is compatible with ⊑.
Proof. We prove by induction on the type σ that -σ is
compatible with ⊑σ. For o and ι this is obvious. Hence,
suppose that σ = τ → σ′.
(i) Let r, r′, r′′ ∈ FJσK be such that r -σ r
′ ⊑σ r
′′. Besides,
let s, s′ ∈ FJτK be such that s -τ s′. Clearly, it holds
that r(s) -σ′ r
′(s′) ⊑σ′ r′′(s′) and by the inductive
hypothesis, r(s) -σ′ r
′′(s′). Hence, r -σ r
′′.
(ii) Let r′ ∈ FJσK and R ⊆ {r ∈ FJσK | r -σ r′} be
arbitrary. Suppose s, s′ ∈ FJτK are such that s -τ s′. By
definition, {r(s) | r ∈ R} ⊆ {t ∈ FJσ′K | t -σ′ r′(s′)}.
Therefore, by the inductive hypothesis, (
⊔
R) (s) =⊔
r∈R r(s) -σ′ r
′(s′). Consequently,
⊔
R -σ r
′.
Lemma 22. Let B - B′ be expansions of A, α - α′ be
valuations and let M be a positive existential term. Then
BJMK(α) - B′JMK(α′).
Proof. We prove the claim by induction on the structure of
M .
• If M is a variable x then BJMK(α) = α(x) - α′(x) =
B′JMK(α′) because of α - α′.
• If M is a logical symbol (other than ¬) then this is a
consequence of Ex. 20(ii).
• If M is a symbol R ∈ Σ′ then BJMK(α) = RB - RB
′
=
B′JMK(α′) because of B - B′.
• If M is an application N N ′ then by the inductive
hypothesis BJNK(α) - B′JNK(α′) and BJN ′K(α) -
B′JN ′K(α′). Therefore, by definition of -,
BJMK(α) = BJNK(α)(BJN ′K(α))
- B′JNK(α′)(B′JN ′K(α′)) = B′JMK(α′)
• Finally, suppose M is an abstraction λx.N . Let s -
s′. By the inductive hypothesis BJNK(α[x 7→ s]) -
B′JNK(α′[x 7→ s′]) and hence,
BJMK(α)(s) = BJNK(α[x 7→ s])
- B′JNK(α′[x 7→ s′]) = B′JMK(α)(s′)
because F is a frame. Due to the fact that this holds for
every s - s′, BJMK(α) - B′JMK(α′).
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Lemma 65. Let ϕ1, . . . , ϕn be background atoms. Then
¬x1M1 ∨ ¬xmMm ∨ ¬ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ϕn |= ¬ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ϕn.
Proof. Let F be a frame and suppose B is an arbitrary (Σ′,F)-
structure satisfying
B |= ¬x1M1 ∨ ¬xmMm ∨ ¬ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ϕn. (2)
Let α be an arbitrary (∆,F)-valuation. We define another
(∆,F)-valuation α′ by
α′(x) =
{
⊤ρ if ∆(x) = ρ
α(x) otherwise (∆(x) = ι)
Clearly, B, α′ 6|= ¬x1M1 ∨ ¬xmMm. Hence, by Eq. (2),
B, α′ |= ¬ϕi for some i. Note that by Remark 2, ϕi only
contains variables of type ι. Hence, also B, α |= ¬ϕi. This
proves, B |= ¬ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ϕn.
Now, Prop. 25 is a simple consequence of the following:
Lemma 66. Let Γ′ be a set of HoCHCs and suppose that
Γ′ ⊢A Γ′ ∪ {C}. Then
(i) if C 6= ⊥ then Γ′ |= C;
(ii) if B is an expansion of A and B |= Γ′ then B |= C.
Proof. (i) Note that by assumption the constraint refutation
rule cannot have been applied. Besides, for β-reduction
this is a consequence of Lemma 58(i). Finally, suppose
that ¬RM ∨G and G′∨Rx are in Γ′ (modulo renaming
of variables). The proof for this case uses the same ideas
as the classic one for 1st-order logic (see e.g. [3], [44]):
(ii) Let B be an expansion of A satisfying B |= Γ′. By
Part (i) it suffices to consider the case when the con-
straint refutation rule is applicable to some goal clause
¬x1M1 ∨ ¬xmMm ∨ ¬ϕ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ϕn, where each ϕi
is a background atom and there exists a valuation α such
that A, α |= ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕn. However, by Lemma 65,
B, α |= ¬ϕ1∨· · ·∨¬ϕn, which is clearly a contradiction
to the fact that B is an expansion of A.
1) Supplementary Materials for Sec. IV-A:
Lemma 67. If - is compatible with ≤ and F is quasi-
continuous then for all ordinals β, aβ - aβ .
Proof. • If β = β˜ + 1 is a successor ordinal then by
the inductive hypothesis, {a
β˜
} ∈ dir(a
β˜
) and by quasi-
continuity, aβ = F (aβ˜) - F (aβ˜) = aβ .
• If β is a limit ordinal then by the inductive hypothesis for
all β˜ < β, a
β˜
- a
β˜
, and by definition, a
β˜
≤ aβ . By (C1),
a
β˜
- aβ (for all β˜ < β) and thus by (C2), aβ - aβ .
Proposition 29. If - is compatible with ≤ and F is quasi-
continuous then (i) for all ordinals β ≤ β′, aβ - aβ′
and (ii) aF - aω.
Proof. (i) We prove by transfinite induction on β that for all
β′ ≥ β, aβ - aβ′ .
• First, suppose β = β˜ + 1 ≤ β′ is a successor ordinal.
If β′ = β′′ + 1 is a successor ordinal, too, then
β˜ ≤ β′′. Therefore, by the inductive hypothesis and
Lemma 67, {aβ′′} ∈ dir(aβ˜). By quasi-continuity of
F , aβ = F (aβ˜) - F (aβ′′) = aβ′ .
Otherwise, β′ is a limit ordinal and β < β′. By
Lemma 67 and definition, aβ - aβ ≤ aβ′ . Hence,
by (C1), aβ - aβ′ .
• Finally, suppose β is a limit ordinal. By the inductive
hypothesis for every β˜ < β, a
β˜
- aβ′ and thus by
(C2), aβ - aβ′ .
(ii) Next, we prove by transfinite induction that for every
ordinal β, aβ - aω. Then the claim follows from (C2).
• First, suppose that β = β′ + 1 is a successor ordinal.
By the inductive hypothesis, aβ′ - aω. Therefore (also
using the first part), {an | n ∈ ω} ∈ dir-(aβ′). Thus,
by quasi-continuity, aβ = F (aβ′) -
∨
n∈ω F (an) =
aω.
• Next, suppose that β is a limit ordinal. By the inductive
hypothesis, aβ′ - aω for every β
′ < β. Therefore, by
(C2), aβ - aω.
Lemma 68. - is compatible with ⊑.
Proof. We prove by induction on the type σ that -σ is
compatible with ⊑σ. For o and ι this is obvious. Hence,
suppose that σ = τ → σ′.
(i) Let r, r′, r′′ ∈ FJσK be such that r -σ r′ ⊑σ r′′.
Besides let s ∈ FJτK and S′ ∈ dir-(s) be arbit-
rary. Clearly, it holds that r(s) -σ′
⊔
s′∈S′ r
′(s′) ⊑σ′⊔
s′∈S′ r
′′(s′). Hence, by the inductive hypothesis,
r(s) -σ′
⊔
s′∈S′ r
′′(s′). Consequently, r -σ r
′′.
(ii) Let r′ ∈ FJσK and R ⊆ {r ∈ FJσK | r -σ r′}
be arbitrary. Besides, suppose s ∈ FJτK and S′ ∈
dir-(s). Clearly, {r(s) | r ∈ R} ⊆ {t ∈ FJσ
′K |
t -σ′
⊔
s′∈S′ r
′(s′)} and hence by the inductive hy-
pothesis, (
⊔
R) (s) =
⊔
r∈R r(s) -σ′
⊔
s′∈S′ r
′(s′).
Consequently,
⊔
R -σ r
′.
The relation - is transitive but neither reflexive (Ex. 69(iv))
nor antisymmetric and coincides with the pointwise ordering
⊑ on the continuous frame C (Lemma 60).
Example 69. (i) For all relational types ρ and s ∈ FJρK,
⊥ρ - s - ⊤ρ.
(ii) or - or and and - and.
(iii) Next, suppose r ∈ FJτ → oK, R′ ∈ dir(r) and s ∈ FJτK
are such that r(s) = 1. If τ = ι then r′(s) = 1 for all r′ ∈
R
′. Otherwise, there exists r′ ∈ R′ satisfying r′(⊤τ ) = 1
because {⊤τ} ∈ dir(s). Consequently, existsτ - existsτ
holds as well.
(iv) δω - δω does not hold (see Ex. 27): clearly {rn | n ∈
N} ∈ dir(rω) but δω(rω) = 1 > 0 = max{δω(rn) | n ∈
N}. This shows that - is not reflexive.
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Lemma 31. Let M be a positive existential term, B be an
expansion of A, B′ ∈ dir(B), α be a valuation and let a′ ∈
dir(α). Then22
BJMK(α) -
⊔
B′∈B′,α′∈a′
B′JMK(α′). (1)
Proof. We prove that for all positive existential terms M ,
expansions B of A, B′ ∈ dir(B), valuations α and a′ ∈ dir(α)
Eq. (1) holds by induction on the structure of M .
• If M is a logical constant (other than ¬) then this is due
to Examples 69(ii) and 69(iii).
• If M is a symbol in Σ′ or a variable then this is by
assumption.
• Next, suppose M is an application M1M2. By the
inductive hypothesis,
BJM1K(α) -
⊔
B1∈B′,α1∈a′
B1JM1K(α1) (3)
BJM2K(α) -
⊔
B2∈B′,α2∈a′
B2JM2K(α2). (4)
Let s := BJM2K(α) and S′ := {B2JM2K(α2) | B2 ∈
B
′ ∧ α2 ∈ a
′}.
Claim 1. S′ ∈ dir(s).
Proof. By Eq. (4), s -
⊔
S′. To prove that S′ is
directed, let B(1),B(2) ∈ B′ and α(1), α(2) ∈ a′.
Since B′ and a′ are directed, {B(1)} ∈ dir(B(1)),
{α(1)} ∈ dir(α(1)) and there are B′ ∈ B′ and α′ ∈ a′
such that {B′} ∈ dir(B(1)) ∩ dir(B(2)) and {α′} ∈
dir(α(1))∩dir(α(2)). Hence, by the inductive hypothesis,
B(1)JM2K(α
(1)) - B(1)JM2K(α
(1)) and for j ∈ {1, 2},
B(j)JM2K(α(j)) - B′JM2K(α′). 
Next, we define
T := {B1JM1K(α1)(B2JM2K(α2))
| B1,B2 ∈ B
′ ∧ α1, α2 ∈ a
′}
T
′ := {B′JM1K(α
′)(B′JM2K(α
′)) | B′ ∈ B′ ∧ α′ ∈ a′}.
Claim 2.
⊔
T -
⊔
T′.
Proof. It suffices to prove that for every t ∈ T there
exists t′ ∈ T′ satisfying t - t′. Then the claim is a
consequence of (C1) and (C2).
Hence, let B1,B2 ∈ B′ and α1, α2 ∈ a′ be arbitrary. By
directedness of B′ and a′, there are B′ ∈ B′ and α′ ∈ a′
such that {B′} ∈ dir(B1)∩dir(B2) and {α′} ∈ dir(α1)∩
dir(α2). Therefore, again by the inductive hypothesis,
B1JM1K(α1) - B
′JM1K(α
′) (5)
B2JM2K(α2) - B
′JM2K(α
′). (6)
Furthermore, due to {B′} ∈ dir(B′), {α′} ∈ dir(α′)
and the inductive hypothesis, B′JM2K(α′) - B′JM2K(α′).
22By Remark 8(i) the right-hand side is well-defined.
Hence (by Eq. (6)), {B′JM2K(α′)} ∈ dir(B2JM2K(α2)).
Therefore, by Eq. (5),
B1JM1K(α1)(B2JM2K(α2))
- B′JM1K(α
′)(B′JM2K(α
′)) ∈ T′. 
Combining everything (Claims 1 and 2, Eq. (3) and [17,
Prop. 2.1.4]), we obtain
BJMK(α) = BJM1K(α)(s)
-
⊔
s′∈S′
( ⊔
B1∈B′,α1∈a′
{B1JM1K(α1)
)
(s′)
=
⊔
T -
⊔
T
′ =
⊔
B′∈B′,α′∈a′
B′JMK(α′).
This concludes the proof of BJM1M2K(α) -⊔
B′∈B′,α′∈a′ B
′JM1M2K(α
′) (because - is transitive).
• Finally, suppose M is λx.M ′. Let s ∈ FJ∆(x)K and
S′ ∈ dir(s). Note that {α′[x 7→ s′] | α′ ∈ a′∧s′ ∈ S′} ∈
dir(α[x 7→ s]). Therefore by the inductive hypothesis,
BJM ′K(α[x 7→ s]) -
⊔
B′∈B′,α′∈a′,
s′∈S′
B′JM ′K(α′[x 7→ s′]).
Consequently,
BJMK(α)(s) = BJM ′K(α[x 7→ s])
-
⊔
B′∈B′,α′∈a′,
s′∈S′
B′JM ′K(α′[x 7→ s′])
=
⊔
B′∈B′,α′∈a′,
s′∈S′
B′JMK(α′)(s′)
=
⊔
s′∈S′
( ⊔
B′∈B′,α′∈a′
B′JMK(α′)
)
(s′)
using [17, Prop. 2.1.4] in the last step. This concludes the
proof of BJλx.M ′K(α) -
⊔
B′∈B′,α′∈a′ B
′Jλx.M ′K(α′).
2) Supplementary Materials for Sec. IV-B: The relation→‖
is defined in Fig. 5.
Proposition 33. Let B be an expansion of A and let M and
N be positive existential terms satisfying M →‖ N . Then for
all valuations α, TΠ(B)JMK(α) = BJNK(α).
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on →‖:
• For variables, symbols from Σ and logical constants
(other than ¬) this is trivial.
• If M is a symbol R ∈ Σ′ \ Σ then TΠ(B)JRK(α) =
BJλxR. FRK(α).
• Next, if M is an application M1M2, M1 →‖ N1 and
M2 →‖ N2 then
TΠ(B)JM1M2K(α) = TΠ(B)JM1K(α)(TΠ(B)JM2K(α))
= BJN1K(α)(BJN2K(α))
= BJN1N2K(α)
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R→‖ λxR. FR
R ∈ Σ′ \ Σ
c→‖ c
c ∈ Σ ∪ {∧,∨, ∃} x→‖ x
M1 →‖ N1 M2 →‖ N2
M1M2 →‖ N1N2
M →‖ N
λx.M →‖ λx.N
Figure 5. Syntactic unfolding
using the inductive hypothesis in the second step.
• Finally, if M is a λ-abstraction λx.M ′ and M ′ →‖ N
′
then
TΠ(B)Jλx.M
′K(α)
= λr ∈ FJ∆(x)K. TΠ(B)JM
′K(α[x 7→ r])
= λr ∈ FJ∆(x)K.BJN ′K(α[x 7→ r])
= BJλx.N ′K(α),
exploiting the fact that F is a frame and the inductive
hypothesis.
Definition 70. A positive existential formula F is ex-normal
if for all subterms ∃M of F , M is a λ-abstraction.
Lemma 71 (Basic properties of →βυ). Suppose M →βυ N .
Then
(i) →‖ ⊆։βυ ,
(ii) fv(N) ⊆ fv(M),
(iii) if M is ex-normal then N is ex-normal, too.
Proof. (i) Straightforward induction on the definition of→‖.
(ii) We prove the first part of the lemma by induction on
the compatible closure of →βυ. If (M,N) ∈ β this
is a standard fact of β-reduction. If (M,N) ∈ υ then
fv(M) = fv(N) = ∅. In the inductive cases the claim
immediately follows from the inductive hypothesis.
(iii) We prove the claim by induction on the compatible
closure of →βυ .
• First, suppose that (R, λxR. FR) ∈ υ. Obviously, FR
is ex-normal and hence, λxR. FR is ex-normal, too.
• Next, suppose that ((λx.M)M ′,M [M ′/x]) ∈ β.
Clearly, M and M ′ must be ex-normal. We prove by
induction on M that M [M ′/x] is ex-normal. If M is
a variable this is obvious (because M ′ is ex-normal).
The cases for (logical) constants and λ-abstractions are
straightforward.
Finally, suppose that M is an application and let ∃L
be a subterm of
M1[M
′/x]M2[M
′/x]
By the inductive hypothesis, both M1[M
′/x] and
M2[M
′/x] are ex-normal. Hence, if ∃K is a subterm
of eitherM1[M
′/x] orM2[M
′/x] thenK must be a λ-
abstraction. Otherwise M1 = ∃ and K = M2[M ′/x].
Then by assumption M2 is a λ-abstraction and clearly,
M2[M
′/x] is a λ-abstraction, too.
• Next, suppose that M1M2 →βυ N1M2 because
M1 →βυ N1. Clearly, M1 is ex-normal. Therefore, by
the inductive hypothesis, N1 is ex-normal. Note that
N1 = ∃ is impossible. Therefore, any subterm ∃L of
N1M2 is either a subterm of N1 orM2, which are both
ex-normal. Hence, L is a λ-abstraction.
• Suppose M1M2 →βυ M1N2 because M2 →βυ N2.
Clearly, M2 is ex-normal. Therefore, by the inductive
hypothesis, N2 is ex-normal. Let ∃L be a subterm of
M1N2. If ∃L is a subterm of M1 or N2 the argument
is as in the previous case. Hence, supposeM1 = ∃ and
L = N2[M
′/x]. By assumption M2 is a λ-abstraction.
Due to M2 →βυ L, L is a λ-abstraction, too.
• Finally, suppose that λx.M →βυ λx.N because
M →βυ N . Clearly, M is ex-normal and hence
by the inductive hypothesis N is ex-normal. Let ∃L
be a subterm of λx.N . Obviously, ∃L must be a
subterm of M , which is ex-normal. Hence, L is a λ-
abstraction.
Lemma 72 (Subject Reduction). Let ∆ ⊢ M : σ be a term
such that M →βυ N . Then
(i) ∆ ⊢ N : σ and
(ii) σ is a relational type.
Proof. (i) We prove the lemma by induction on the com-
patible closure of βυ. For (M,N) ∈ β this is [45,
Proposition 1.2.6]. If (R, λxR. FR) ∈ υ and R : τ →
o ∈ Σ′ \ Σ then by convention ∆(xR) = τ and hence,
∆ ⊢ λxR. FR : τ → o, too. The proofs for the recursive
cases are exactly as in the proof of [45, Proposition 1.2.6].
(ii) Clearly, it suffices to prove by induction on the compat-
ible closure of βυ that M →βυ N implies ∆ 6⊢ M :
ιn → ι for all n ∈ N.
• If (M,N) ∈ βυ then clearly ∆ 6⊢ M : ιn → ι for all
n ∈ N.
• Next, supposeM1M2 →βυ N1N2 due toM1 →βυ N1.
Then by the inductive hypothesis ∆ 6⊢M1 : ιn → ι for
all n ∈ N. Hence, clearly ∆ 6⊢M1M2 : ιm → ι for all
m ∈ N.
• Suppose M1M2 →βυ N1N2 due to M2 →βυ N2
and assume towards contradiction that ∆ ⊢ M1M2 :
ιn → ι. Then ∆ ⊢ M1 : σ → ιn → ι and
∆ ⊢ M2 : σ for some σ. However, by the definition
of types this implies σ = ι, which contradicts the
inductive hypothesis.
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• Finally, if λx.M ′ →βυ λx.N then clearly ∆ 6⊢
λx.M ′ : ιn → ι for all n ∈ N.
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Lemma 73 (Basic Properties of −→
ℓ
). Let L,M,N and Q be
terms. Then
(i) −→
ℓ
is reflexive and transitive;
(ii) −→
ℓ
⊆։βυ;
(iii) if M
0
−→
ℓ
N then M = N ;
(iv) if L
m+1
−−−→
ℓ
N then there exists M satisfying L
1
−→
ℓ
M
m
−→
ℓ
N ;
(v) if M Q is a term and M −→
ℓ
N then M Q −→
ℓ
N Q;
(vi) if M [Q/z] is a term and M −→
ℓ
N then M [Q/z] −→
ℓ
N [Q/z].
Proof. (i) Completely trivial.
(ii) Straightforward induction on the definition of
m
−→
ℓ
(iii) Straightforward induction on the definition of
0
−→
ℓ
(iv) Straightforward induction on the definition of
m+1
−−−→
ℓ
(v) Straightforward induction on the definition of M
m
−→
ℓ
N
noting that for ◦ ∈ {∧,∨} the cases M1 ◦M2
m1+m2−−−−−→
ℓ
N1 ◦ N2 and ∃x.M ′
m
−→
ℓ
∃x.N ′ cannot occur because
(M1 ◦M2)Q and (∃x.M ′)Q are not terms.
(vi) We prove by induction on M
m
−→
ℓ
N that M [Q/z]
m
−→
ℓ
N [Q/z].
• If M = N and m = 0 then also M [Q/z]
0
−→
ℓ
N [Q/z].
• If there exist L, m1 and m2 such that M
m1−−→
ℓ
L
m2−−→
ℓ
N and m = m1+m2 then by the inductive hypothesis
M [Q/z]
m1−−→
ℓ
L[Q/z]
m2−−→
ℓ
N [Q/z]. Consequently,
M [Q/z]
m
−→
ℓ
N [Q/z].
• Next, suppose that M is M1 ◦ M2 for ◦ ∈ {∧,∨}
and that there exist m1 and m2 such that m = m1 +
m2 and Mj
mj
−−→
ℓ
Nj for j ∈ {1, 2}. By the inductive
hypothesis, Mj[Q/z]
mj
−−→
ℓ
Nj[Q/z]. Consequently,
(M1 ◦M2)[Q/z] = (M1[Q/z] ◦M2[Q/z])
m1+m2−−−−−→
ℓ
(N1[Q/z] ◦N2[Q/z])
= (N1 ◦N2)[Q/z].
• Suppose thatM is ∃x.M ′ and that ∃x.M ′
m
−→
ℓ
∃x.N ′.
By the inductive hypothesis, M ′[Q/z]
m
−→
ℓ
N ′[Q/z].
By the variable convention, x 6= z. Hence,
(∃x.M ′)[Q/z] = ∃x.M ′[Q/z]
m
−→
ℓ
∃x.N ′[Q/z] = (∃x.N ′)[Q/z].
• Suppose that M is RM
′
for R ∈ Σ′ \ Σ and that
RM
′ 1
−→
ℓ
(λxR. FR)M
′
. Clearly,
(RM
′
)[Q/z] = RM
′
[Q/z]
1
−→
ℓ
(λxR. FR)M
′
[Q/z] = ((λxR. FR)M
′
)[Q/z]
using the variable convention and the fact that λxR. FR
is closed.
• Finally, suppose that M is (λx.M ′)M ′′M
′′′
and that
(λx.M ′)M ′′M
′′′ 1
−→
ℓ
M ′[M ′′/x]M
′′′
.
By the variable convention x 6= z. Hence
((λx.M ′)M ′′M
′′′
)[Q/z]
= (λx.M ′[Q/z])M ′′[Q/z]M
′′′
[Q/z]
1
−→
ℓ
M ′[Q/z][M ′′[Q/z]/x]M
′′′
[Q/z]
= (M ′[M ′′/x]M
′′′
)[Q/z]
using the Nested Substitution Lemma from [15, 2.1.16.
Substitution Lemma].
Besides, the following Inversion Lemma is immediate by
definition.
Lemma 74 (Inversion). (i) If ∃x.E
m
−→
ℓ
F then there exists
F ′ such that F ′ = ∃x. F ′ and E
m
−→
ℓ
F ′.
(ii) If E1 ◦ · · ·◦En
m
−→
ℓ
F , where ◦ ∈ {∧,∨}, then there exist
F1, . . . , Fn and m1, . . . ,mn satisfying F = F1 ◦· · ·◦Fn,
m =
∑n
i=1mi and Ej
mj
−−→
ℓ
Fj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
(iii) If ∃x.A1 ∧ · · · ∧ An
m
−→
ℓ
F then there exist F1, . . . , Fn
and m1, . . . ,mn satisfying F = ∃x. F1 ∧ · · · ∧ Fn, m =∑n
i=1mi and Aj
mj
−−→
ℓ
Fj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
(iv) If (λx.K)LM
1
−→
ℓ
N then N = K[L/x]M .
Lemma 75 (Basic Properties of −→s ). (i) −→s is reflexive (on
positive existential terms).
(ii) −→s ⊆։βυ.
(iii) If L −→s N and O −→s Q then LO −→s N Q.
(iv) If K −→
ℓ
L −→s N then K −→s N .
(v) If L −→s N and O −→s Q then L[O/z] −→s N [Q/z].
Proof. (i) We prove by structural induction onM thatM −→s
M . M has the form M1 · · ·Mn, where M1 is either a
variable, a symbol from Σ′∪{∧,∨∃τ} or a λ-abstraction.
In any case the inductive hypothesis and the reflexivity
of −→
ℓ
immediately yield that M1 · · ·Mn −→s M1 · · ·Mn.
We prove the remaining four parts by induction on the
definition of −→s . We only show the detailed proof for the case
L −→s xN due to L −→ℓ xM and M −→s N for some M (the
other cases are analogous).
(ii) By Lemma 73(ii) and the inductive hypothesis, L ։βυ
xM and M ։βυ N . Therefore clearly, L ։βυ
xM ։βυ xN and hence also, L։βυ xN .
(iii) By Lemma 73(v), LO −→
ℓ
xM O and hence by definition
LO −→s xN Q.
(iv) By transitivity of −→
ℓ
(Lemma 73(i)), K −→
ℓ
xM and
hence by definition K −→s xN .
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(v) By the inductive hypothesis, M [O/z] −→s N [Q/z] and by
assumption or Part (i), x[O/z] −→s x[Q/z]. Therefore by
Part (iii) and Lemma 73(vi),
L[O/z] −→
ℓ
x[O/z]M [O/z] −→s x[Q/z]N [Q/z],
which proves L[O/z] −→s (xN )[Q/z] by Part (iv).
Lemma 76 (Inversion). Let E be an ex-normal formula.
(i) If E −→s xN then there exists M such that E −→ℓ xM .
(ii) If E −→s cN , where c ∈ Σ
′ ∪{∧,∨, ∃τ}, then there exists
M such that E −→
ℓ
cM and M −→s N .
(iii) If E −→s ∃N then there exist x, N
′ and M such that
N = (λx.N ′), E −→
ℓ
∃x.M and M −→s N
′.
Proof. The first two parts are obvious by definition of −→s .
Hence, suppose that E −→s ∃N .
By Lemmas 75(ii) and 71(iii), N has the form λx.N ′ for
some N ′. Furthermore, by Part (ii) there exists L such that
E −→
ℓ
∃τL and L −→s λx.N
′. Again, by Lemmas 73(ii)
and 71(iii), L has the form λy. L′. By definition of −→s ,
(λy. L′) −→s (λx.N
′) implies that there exists M such that
(λy. L′) −→
ℓ
(λx.M) and M −→s N
′. However, (λy. L′) −→
ℓ
(λx.M) clearly implies y = x and L′ = M . Consequently,
E −→
ℓ
∃x.M and M −→s N
′.
Lemma 34. If K −→s M →βυ N then K −→s N .
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on K −→s M .
• First, suppose K −→s xM1 · · ·Mn because for some
L1, . . . , Ln, K −→ℓ xL1 · · ·Ln and Li −→s Mi for each
i. Clearly, xM1 · · ·Mn →βυ xN1 · · ·Nn, because of
Mj →βυ Nj for some j and Mi = Ni for i 6= j are the
only possible βυ-reductions. By the inductive hypothesis,
Lj −→s Nj and therefore by definition, L −→s xN1 · · ·Nn.
• Next, suppose K −→s cM because for some L, K −→ℓ
c L and L −→s M . If c = R ∈ Σ
′ \ Σ and RM →βυ
(λxR. FR)M thenK −→ℓ RL
1
−→
ℓ
(λxR. FR)L. Therefore,
by reflexivity of −→s (Lemma 75(i)), K −→s (λxR. FR)M .
Otherwise, M is reduced and the argument is analogous
to the case for K −→s xM .
• Finally, suppose K −→s (λx.M
′)M because for some L′
and L, K −→
ℓ
(λx. L′)L, L′ −→s M
′ and L −→s M . Let
L = (L1, . . . , Ln) and M = (M1, . . . ,Mn).
First, suppose (λx.M ′)M →βυ (λx.N ′)M , where
M ′ →βυ N ′. By the inductive hypothesis, L′ −→s N
′.
Therefore, by definition, (λx.K ′)K −→s (λx.N
′)M .
The argument for the case (λx.M ′)M1 · · ·Mn →βυ
(λx.M ′)N1 · · ·Nn, where for some j, Mj →βυ Nj and
Mk = Nk for all k 6= j, is very similar.
Finally, assume that n ≥ 1 and (λx.M ′)M1 · · ·Mn →βυ
M ′[M1/x]M2 · · ·Mn. Then
L −→
ℓ
(λx. L′)L1 · · ·Ln
1
−→
ℓ
L′[L1/x]L2 · · ·Ln
−→s M
′[M1/x]M2 · · ·Mn, Lemmas 75(iii) and 75(v),
which proves L −→s M
′[M1/x]M2 · · ·Mn by Lem-
mas 73(i) and 75(iv).
Lemma 37. Let G be a goal clause, F be a β-normal positive
existential formula and α be a valuation such that A0, α |= F
and posex(G) −→s F . Then there exists a positive existential
formula F ′ satisfying posex(G) −→
ℓ
F ′ and α ⊲ F ′.
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction on the structure of
F . Note that the case (λx.N ′)N cannot occur for otherwise
F is not in β-normal form or does not have type o. If F has
the form xN then by the Inversion Lemma 76 there exists M
such that posex(G) −→
ℓ
xM , and clearly, α ⊲ xM .
Hence, the only remaining case is that F has the form
cN . By the Inversion Lemma 76 there exist M such that
posex(G) −→
ℓ
cM and M −→s N . Note that c ∈ Σ
′ implies
c : ιn → o ∈ Σ for otherwise A0, α 6|= cN . By Lemmas 72(ii)
and 75(ii), M = N and thus A0, α |= cM . Consequently,
α ⊲ cM .
Next, suppose that c is ∧. Then F is N1 ∧ N2 and cM
has the form M1 ∧ M2. By Lemma 73(ii) and the Subject
Reduction Lemma 72,Mj is a positive existential formula and
clearly, by assumption, Nj is in β-normal form and A0, α |=
Nj for all j ∈ {1, 2}. By the inductive hypothesis, there are
N ′1 and N
′
2 satisfying Mj −→ℓ N
′
j and α ⊲ N
′
j . Consequently,
α ⊲ N ′1 ∧N
′
2 and by definition, posex(G) −→ℓ N
′
1 ∧N
′
2.
The case where c is ∨ is very similar.
Finally, suppose that c is ∃τ and that F is ∃τN1. By
the Inversion Lemma 76 there exist x, N ′ and M such that
N1 = (λx.N
′), posex(G) −→
ℓ
∃x.M and M −→s N
′. By
Lemma 73(ii) and the Subject Reduction Lemma 72, M is
a positive existential formula and clearly N ′ is in β-normal
form and A0, α[x 7→ r] |= N
′ for some r ∈ FJτK. By the
inductive hypothesis, there exists N ′′ satisfying M −→
ℓ
N ′′
and α[x 7→ r] ⊲ N ′′. Consequently, α ⊲ ∃x.N ′′ and by
definition, posex(G) −→
ℓ
∃x.N ′′.
4) Supplementary Materials for Sec. IV-D: The proof of
the following lemma is a straightforward induction on the
definition of ⊲:
Lemma 77. Let α, α′ be valuations and F be positive ex-
istential formulas satisfying α ⊲ F . If α(x) = α′(x) for all
x ∈ fv(F ) then α′ ⊲ F .
Proposition 38. Let Γ′ ⊇ Γ be a set of HoCHCs satisfying
0 < µ(Γ′) < ω. Then there exists Γ′′ ⊇ Γ satisfying Γ′ ⊢A Γ′′
and µ(Γ′′) < µ(Γ′).
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Proof. Let G ∈ Γ′ be a goal clause, F be a (closed) positive
existential formula, α be a valuation and let m = µ(G) > 0
be such that posex(G)
m
−→
ℓ
F and α ⊲ F . W.l.o.g. we can
assume that
fv(G) ∩ fv(C) = ∅ for all C ∈ Γ′. (7)
(Otherwise, rename all variables occurring in G to obtain G˜
satisfying Eq. (7) and clearly, by definition of ⊢A, Γ
′∪{G˜} ⊢A
Γ′ ∪ {G˜, G′} implies Γ′ ⊢A Γ′ ∪ {G′}.)
Furthermore, suppose that G = ¬A1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬An and
posex(G) = ∃x.
∧n
i=1 Ai. By the Inversion Lemma 74, there
exist F1, . . . , Fn and m1, . . . ,mn such that F = ∃x.
∧n
i=1 Fi,
m =
∑n
i=1mi and Aj
mj
−−→
ℓ
Fj for each 1 ≤ j ≤ m. Note that
due to α ⊲ F we can assume w.l.o.g. that also α ⊲ Fj for each
1 ≤ j ≤ n, and furthermore we can assume that m1 > 0. By
Lemma 73(iv), there exists E such that A1
1
−→
ℓ
E
m1−1−−−−→
ℓ
F1.
Since A1 is an atom there are exactly two cases:
(i) A1 = (λy. L)M N and E = L[M/y]N or
(ii) A1 = RM and E = (λxR. FR)M .
The first case is easy because for G′ = ¬L[M/y]N ∨∨n
i=2 ¬Ai, Γ
′ ∪ {G} ⊢A Γ′ ∪ {G,G′} and posex(G′) =
∃x. L[M/y]N ∧
∧n
i=2 Ai.
In the second case, note that
1
−→
ℓ
is functional on applied
λ-abstractions (by the Inversion Lemma 74). Hence, we can
assume that
(λxR. FR)M −→ℓ FR[M/xR]
m∗1−−→
ℓ
F1,
where m∗1 ≤ m1 − 1 for otherwise α ⊲ F1 would clearly not
hold.
FR has the form posex(GR,1, xR)∨· · ·∨posex(GR,k, xR),
where each GR,j is a goal clause and GR,j ∨ RxR ∈
Γ′. Let y1, . . . , yk and E
′
1, . . . , E
′
k be such that for each
j, posex(GR,j , xR) = ∃yj . E
′
j . Note that by Eq. (7),
posex(GR, xR)[M/xR] = ∃yj . E
′
j [M/xR] for each j and
by the Inversion Lemma 74, there exist F ′1, . . . , F
′
k and
m′1, . . . ,m
′
k such that F1 =
∨k
j=1(∃yj . F
′
j), E
′
j [M/xR]
m′j
−−→
ℓ
F ′j and m
′
j ≤ m
∗
1 for each j.
Next, because of α ⊲ F1 there exists 1 ≤ j ≤ k and r ∈
FJ∆(yj)K satisfying α[yj 7→ r] ⊲ F
′
j . Furthermore, because
of Eq. (7) and Lemmas 71(ii) and 77, α[yj 7→ r] ⊲ Fi for all
2 ≤ i ≤ n. Therefore,
α[yj 7→ r] ⊲ F
′
j ∧
n∧
i=2
Fi. (8)
Clearly, it holds that
Γ′ ∪ {G} ⊢A Γ
′ ∪
{
G,GR,j [M/xR] ∨
n∨
i=2
¬Ai
}
(9)
E′j [M/xR] ∧
n∧
i=2
A2
m′j+
∑n
i=2mi
−−−−−−−−−→
ℓ
F ′j ∧
n∧
i=2
Fi (10)
and fv(G′) ⊆ x ∪ y. Let x′ ⊆ x and y′ ⊆ y be such that
fv(G′) = x′ ∪ y′. Hence, posex(G′) = ∃x′, y′. E′j [M/xR] ∧∧n
i=2 A2. We define
G′ := GR,j [M/xR] ∨
n∨
i=2
¬Ai
F ′ := ∃x′, y′. Ej ∧
n∧
n=2
Fi
m′ := m′j +
n∑
i=2
mi.
By Eqs. (8) to (10), it holds that
(i) Γ′ ⊢A Γ′ ∪ {G′}, (ii) posex(G′)
m′
−−→
ℓ
F ′, (iii) α ⊲ F ′
and (iv)m′ ≤ m∗1+
∑n
i=2mi <
∑n
i=1mi = m. Consequently,
also µ(Γ′ ∪ {G′}) < µ(Γ′)
frame). By the inductive hypothesis and Lemma 22,
D. Supplementary Materials for Sec. VI
Theorem 43 (Soundness and Completeness). Let A be a
compact set of Σ-structures and Γ be a set of HoCHCs. Then
Γ is A-unsatisfiable iff Γ ⊢∗
A
Γ′ ∪ {⊥} for some Γ′.
Proof. The “if”-direction is straightforward. For the con-
verse, suppose that Γ is A-unsatisfiable. By the Complete-
ness Thm. 26, for each A ∈ A there exist GA, every
atom of which has the form xM , and background atoms
ϕA,i and ΓA such that A 6|= ¬ϕA,1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ϕA,mA and
Γ ⊢∗A ΓA ∪ {GA ∨ ¬ϕA,1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ϕA,mA} = Γ
′
A. Hence,
{¬ϕA,1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ϕA,mA | A ∈ A} is A-unsatisfiable and
by compactness of A there exists finite A′ ⊆ A such that
{¬ϕA,1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬ϕA,mA | A ∈ A
′} is A-unsatisfiable.
Consequently, Γ ⊢∗
A
{Γ′A | A ∈ A
′} ⊢A {⊥} ∪ {Γ
′
A | A ∈
A′}.
E. Supplementary Materials for Sec. VII
1) λ-lifting: In this section, we examine how to eliminate
λ-abstractions. We make use of the notion of terms with holes
(cf. [15, p. 29], [45]).
Let λy.M be a positive existential Σ′-term not containing
logical symbols with free variables x such that ∆ ⊢M : τ →
o, let Γ˜[−] be a set of terms with a hole of type∆(y)→ τ → o
such that Γ[λy.M ] is a set of HoCHCs.
Let z be distinct variables (different from x, y) satisfying
∆(z) = τ . We define a signature Σ′′ := Σ′ ∪ {RM : ∆(x)→
∆(y)→ τ → o} and
Γ := Γ˜[λy.M ] Γ′ := Γ˜[RM x] ∪ {¬M z ∨RM x y z}.
These are sets of HoCHCs.
Proposition 78. Let A ∈ A. Then Γ is A-monotone-satisfiable
iff Γ′ is A-monotone-satisfiable.
Proof. • First, suppose that there exists a (Σ′,M)-
expansion B of A satisfying B |= Γ. We define a
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(Σ′′,M)-expansion B′ of A by setting RB
′
:= RB
for R ∈ Σ′ \ Σ and RB
′
M := BJλx, y, z.M zK. By
definition, B′ |= ¬M z ∨ RM x y z. Furthermore for
every positive existential Σ′-formula E and valuation
α, BJE[λy.M ]K(α) = B′JE[RM x]K(α). Consequently,
B′ |= Γ′.
• Conversely, suppose Γ′ is A-monotone-satisfiable. Let
B := AΠΓ′ . By Thm. 23, B |= Γ
′. Furthermore,
by Lemma 62(i) and Prop. 17, B = TΠΓ′ (B). Thus,
RBM = BJλx, y, z.M zK and therefore, by Lemma 58,
BJRM xK(α) = BJλy.MK(α) for every valuation α.
Consequently, B |= Γ.
Hence, we conclude:
Corollary 79. Let A be a set of 1st-order Σ-structures and
Γ be a finite set of HoCHCs. Then there exists a set of
HoCHCs (over an extended signature) which does not contain
λ-abstractions and which is A-satisfiable iff Γ is A-satisfiable.
2) Proof of Lemma 46: Before turning to Lemma 46, we
prove the following auxiliary lemma:
Lemma 80. Let M,M1, . . . ,Mn and L be terms neither
containing logical symbols nor λ-abstractions. Then:
(i) If R ∈ Σ′ \ Σ, RM1 · · ·Mn and Rx1 · · ·xn are terms
such that fv(RM1 · · ·Mn) ∩ fv(Rx1 · · ·xn) = ∅ then
[⌊M1⌋
′/x1, . . . , ⌊Mn⌋
′/xn]
is a unifier of ⌊RM1 · · ·Mn⌋′ and ⌊Rx1 · · ·xn⌋′.
(ii) If ∆(y) = ρ = τ1 → · · · → τn → o and yM1 · · ·Mn is
a formula such that fv(Compρ) ∩ fv(yM1 · · ·Mn) then
[cρ/y, ⌊M1⌋
′/x1, . . . , ⌊Mn⌋
′/xn]
is a unifier of Compρ and ⌊yM1 · · ·Mn⌋.
(iii) If M is a term neither containing logical symbols nor
λ-abstractions then
⌊M [L/x]⌋′ = ⌊M⌋′[⌊L⌋′/x].
(iv) If G is a goal clause then ⌊G[M1/x1, . . . ,Mn/xn]⌋ =
⌊G⌋[⌊M1⌋′/x1, . . . , ⌊Mn⌋′/xn].
Proof. (i) We prove Part (i) by induction on n. For n = 0
this is trivial. Hence, suppose n ≥ 0. By the inductive
hypothesis,
⌊RM1 · · ·Mn⌋
′[⌊M1⌋
′/x1, . . . , ⌊Mn⌋
′/xn]
= ⌊Rx1 · · ·xn⌋
′[⌊M1⌋
′/x1, . . . , ⌊Mn⌋
′/xn]. (11)
Consequently,
⌊RM1 · · ·Mn+1⌋
′[⌊M1⌋
′/x1, . . . , ⌊Mn+1⌋
′/xn+1]
= (@ ⌊RM1 · · ·Mn⌋
′ ⌊Mn+1⌋
′)
[⌊M1⌋
′/x1, . . . , ⌊Mn+1⌋
′/xn+1]
= @ ⌊RM1 · · ·Mn⌋
′[⌊M1⌋
′/x1, . . . , ⌊Mn⌋
′/xn] ⌊Mn+1⌋
′
= (@ ⌊Rx1 · · ·xn⌋
′ xn+1)[⌊M1⌋
′/x1, . . . , ⌊Mn+1⌋
′/xn+1]
= ⌊Rxn · · ·x1⌋
′[⌊M1⌋
′/x1, . . . , ⌊Mn+1⌋
′/xn+1],
using that xi 6∈ fv(Mj) in the second and Eq. (11) in the
third step.
(ii) Similar to Part (i).
(iii) We prove the claim by structural induction. For variables,
and symbols from Σ′ \Σ this is obvious. Next, consider
a term of the form cN , where c ∈ Σ. By Remark 2, cN
only contains variables y : ι and for each term ∆ ⊢ K :
ιn → ι, ⌊K⌋′ = K . Hence,
⌊(cN)[L/x]⌋′ = (cN)[L/x] = ⌊cN⌋′[⌊L⌋′/x].
Finally, consider a term of the formMN N ′, whereM 6∈
Σ. Then,
⌊(M N N ′)[L/x]⌋′ = ⌊(M N)[L/x]N ′[L/x]⌋′
= @ ⌊(M N)[L/x]⌋′ ⌊N ′[L/x]⌋′
= @ ⌊M N⌋′[⌊L⌋′/x] ⌊N ′⌋′[⌊L⌋′/x]
= (@ ⌊M N⌋′ ⌊N ′⌋′)[⌊L⌋′/x]
= ⌊M N N ′⌋′[⌊L⌋′/x],
using the inductive hypothesis in the third step.
(iv) Immediate from Part (iii).
Lemma 46. Let Γ′ be a set of HoCHCs not containing λ-
abstractions and suppose Γ′ ⊢A Γ′ ∪ {G}. Then
(i) G does not contain λ-abstractions
(ii) if G 6= ⊥ then ⌊Γ′⌋ |= ⌊Γ′ ∪ {G}⌋
(iii) if G = ⊥ then ⌊Γ′⌋ is A-unsatisfiable.
Proof. (i) Obvious.
(ii) Note that by assumption the β-reduction rule is not
applicable. Next, let ¬RM ∨G1 and G2∨Rx be clauses
in Γ′ modulo renaming of variables (such that they are
variable-disjoint) and suppose G = G1 ∨ (G2[M/x]).
By Lemma 80(i), ⌊RM⌋[⌊M⌋′/x] = ⌊Rx⌋[⌊M⌋′/x], by
soundness of 1st-order resolution [3], [44],
⌊Γ′⌋ |= (⌊G1⌋ ∨ ⌊G2⌋)[⌊M⌋
′/x]
and by Lemma 80(iv),
(⌊G1⌋ ∨ ⌊G2⌋)[⌊M⌋
′/x] = ⌊G1 ∨ (G2[M/x])⌋.
Furthermore, vars(G) ⊆ vars(¬RM ∨ G1) ∪ vars(G2)
and therefore ⌊Γ′ ∪ {G}⌋ = ⌊Γ′⌋ ∪ {⌊G⌋}.
(iii) Finally, suppose that there exists {
∨m′j
i=1 ¬xj,iMj,i ∨∨mj
i=1 ¬ϕj,i | 1 ≤ j ≤ n} ⊆ Γ
′ such that {
∨mj
i=1 ¬ϕj,i |
1 ≤ j ≤ n} is A-unsatisfiable. Note that each xj,i does
not occur in any of the ϕj′,i′ . Therefore, by Lemma 80(ii),
the fact that Comp∆(xj,i) ∈ ⌊Γ
′⌋ and the soundness of
1st-order resolution, ⌊Γ′⌋ |= {
∨mj
i=1 ¬ϕj,i | 1 ≤ j ≤ n}.
Hence, by assumption ⌊Γ′⌋ is A-unsatisfiable.
F. Supplementary Materials for Sec. VIII
1) Higher-order Datalog: First consider the higher-order
extension of Datalog.
Assumption. Let Σ ⊇ {≈, 6≈ : ι → ι → o, c0 : ι} be a finite
1st-order signature containing ≈, 6≈ and symbol(s) of type ι
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(but nothing else); let Σ′ be a relational extension of Σ and
Γ be a finite set of HoCHCs.
Besides, let A be the set of (1st-order) Σ-structures A
satisfying ≈A(a)(b) = 1 iff 6≈A(a)(b) = 0 iff a = b, for
a, b ∈ AJιK.
In this setting we refer to HoCHCs as higher-order Datalog
clauses (HoDC). For A ∈ A we define A♭ by
A♭JιK := {c : ι ∈ Σ} ≈A
♭
(c)(d) := AJc ≈ dK
cA
♭
:= c 6≈A
♭
(c)(d) := AJc 6≈ dK
for c, d : ι ∈ Σ and we set A♭ := {A♭ | A ∈ A}. Clearly, A♭
is finite and for each A ∈ A and type σ, A♭JσK is finite.
Lemma 81. Let ϕ be a background atom and α be a valuation
satisfying A♭, α |= ϕ then A, α♯ |= ϕ, where α♯ is a valuation
such that for each x : ι ∈ ∆, α♯(x) = AJα(x)K.
Corollary 82. Let Γ′ be a set of goal clauses of background
atoms. Γ′ is A♭-satisfiable if Γ′ is A-satisfiable.
Lemma 83. Let Γ′ be a set of goal clauses of background
atoms. Γ′ is A-satisfiable if Γ′ is A♭-satisfiable.
Proof. Let A♭ ∈ A♭ be such that A♭ |= Γ′. Consider the
element A♭/≈ of A with domain
(A♭/≈)JιK := {{d ∈ A♭JιK | A |= c ≈ d} | c ∈ A♭JιK},
i.e. the quotient of A♭JιK over ≈A
♭
. It is easy to see that
A♭/≈ |= Γ′.
Note that both A and A♭ are compact. Hence, by soundness
and completeness of the proof system (Thm. 26 and Prop. 25)
we obtain:
Proposition 84. Γ is A-satisfiable iff Γ is A♭-satisfiable.
Consequently, by Remark 49, we conclude:
Theorem 85. It is decidable whether there exists a Σ′-
structure B satisfying B |= Γ and ≈B(a)(b) = 1 iff
6≈B(a)(b) = 0 iff a = b, for a, b ∈ BJιK.
2) Supplementary Materials for Sec. VIII-A:
Lemma 86. Let Γ′ be a set of HoBHC(SLA). If Γ′ ⊢A Γ′∪{G}
then G is a HoBHC(SLA) and gtι(G) ⊆ gtι(Γ
′).
Proof. For the compact constraint refutation rule this is trivial.
Next, if ¬(λx. L)M N ∨ G is a HoBHC(SLA) then
neither (λx. L)M N nor L[M/x]N contain symbols from
Σ and gtι((λx. L)M N) = gtι(L[M/x]N) = ∅. Hence,
¬L[M/x]N ∨ G is a HoBHC(SLA) and gtι(¬L[M/x]N ∨
G) = gtι(¬(λx. L)M N ∨G).
Finally, suppose ¬RM∨G andG′∨Rx are HoBHC(SLA)s.
Note that all terms inM of type ι must be variables. Therefore
G ∨ G′[M/x] is a HoBHC(SLA) and gtι(G ∨ G
′[M/x]) =
gtι(¬RM ∨G) ∪ gtι(G
′ ∨Rx).
Lemma 53. Let Γ′ be a set of HoBHC(SLA) satisfying
gtι(Γ
′) ⊆ gtι(Γ). Then
(i) Γ′ ⊢A Γ′ ∪ {G} implies (Γ′)♭ ⊢A♭ (Γ
′)♭ ∪ {G♭}
(ii) (Γ′)♭ ⊢A♭ (Γ
′)♭ ∪ {G} implies Γ′ ⊢A Γ′ ∪ {G♯}.
Proof. For the rule compact constraint refutation this is due to
Lemma 52 and for the β-reduction rule this is obvious because
((λx. L)M N)♭ = (λx. L)M N .
Finally, suppose that {¬RM ∨G,G′ ∨Rx} ⊆ Γ′. It holds
that (RM)♭ = RM , (Rx)♭ = Rx and for every atom
A, A♭[M/x] = (A[M/x])♭. Consequently, (G′)♭[M/x] =
(G′[M/x])♭ and the lemma also holds for applications of the
resolution rule.
Theorem 87. Let Φ be a predicate on atoms23 satisfying
(i) Φ(Γ) = 1,
(ii) if Γ′ ⊢A Γ′′ then Φ(Γ′′) ≥ Φ(Γ′) and
(iii) if Γ′ is an A-unsatisfiable set of HoCHCs satisfying
Φ(Γ′) = 1 then there exists a finite subset Γ′′ ⊆ Γ′ which
is A-unsatisfiable.
Then Γ is A-unsatisfiable iff Γ ⊢∗
A
Γ′ ∪ {⊥} for some Γ′.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Thm. 43.
Proposition 54. If Γ is A-unsatisfiable then Γ ⊢∗
A
Γ′ ∪ {⊥}
for some Γ′.
Proof. Define Φ(A) = 1 just if gtι(A) ⊆ gtι(Γ) and ¬A is a
HoBHC(SLA). By Lemmas 52 and 86, Thm. 87 is applicable,
which yields the theorem.
23which is lifted to clauses by setting Φ(¬A1 ∨ · · · ∨ ¬An ∨ (¬)A) :=
min{Φ(A1), . . . ,Φ(An),Φ(A)} and to sets of HoCHCs Γ′ by setting
Φ(Γ′) = min{Φ(C) | C ∈ Γ′}
23
